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A DOMESTIC RIGHT OF RETURN?: RACE, 
RIGHTS, AND RESIDENCY IN NEW 
ORLEANS IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
HURRICANE KATRINA 
Lolita Buckner Inniss* 
Abstract: This article begins with a critical account of what occurred in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. This critique serves as the backdrop 
for a discussion of whether there are international laws or norms that give 
poor, black Katrina victims the right to return to and resettle in New Or-
leans. In framing this discussion, this article first briefly explores some of 
the housing deprivations suffered by Katrina survivors that have led to 
widespread displacement and dispossession. The article then discusses 
two of the chief barriers to the return of poor blacks to New Orleans: the 
broad perception of a race-crime nexus and the general effect of the im-
position of outsider status on poor, black people by dominant groups. Fi-
nally, the article explores the international law concept of the right of re-
turn and its expression as a domestic, internal norm via standards 
addressing internally displaced persons, and considers how such a “do-
mestic right of return” might be applicable to the Katrina victims. 
“As a practical matter, these poor folks don’t have the resources to go back to 
our city, just like they didn’t have the resources to get out of our city.” . . . 
“So we won’t get all those folks back. That’s just a fact. It’s not what I 
want, it’s just a fact.” 
—Joseph Canizaro, member of New Orleans’s rebuilding 
commission1 
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Introduction 
A. Gone with the Wind, and The Wind Done Gone2—  
Hurricane Katrina and Its Aftermath 
 On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, a massive Category Four 
storm, hit New Orleans, Louisiana and the surrounding Gulf Coast area 
with a destructive wrath not felt in the area in decades.3 Eighty percent 
of New Orleans was flooded.4 Some of the most severely damaged areas 
of the city were the Lower Ninth Ward, Central City, and the Seventh 
Ward, all areas heavily populated by African Americans.5 In the wake of 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the Wind (Scribner 1996) (1936); Alice 
Randall, The Wind Done Gone (2001). This playful header to a very sobering topic re-
calls a 2001 book by Alice Randall called The Wind Done Gone and the controversy it gener-
ated. E.g., Nancy Pate, A Conversation with Alice Randall, Orlando Sentinel, Aug. 25, 2001, 
at E1. Randall’s book parodied Margaret Mitchell’s iconic novel of the antebellum South, 
Gone With the Wind. See Mitchell, supra; Randall, supra. In her book Randall takes sharp 
aim at the saccharine, hackneyed, and thoroughly racist mythology which characterized 
Mitchell’s book. See Mitchell, supra; Randall, supra. In choosing this header, I am con-
sciously “signifying.” See Angelyn Mitchell, The Freedom to Remember: Narrative, 
Slavery, and Gender in Contemporary Black Women’s Fiction 14 (2002). Signifying is 
the act of “reversing, revising, or parodying another’s speech or discourse.” Id. Signifying is 
verbal play that is often dual edged, being simultaneously obtuse and subtle. See Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr., The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of Afro-American Literary 
Criticism 80–81 (1988). Its purpose may be anything from didactic to critical to entertain-
ing, and sometimes all three at once. Signifying may occur in various forms including 
“repetition with a signal difference,” “troping,” or as “a metaphor for textual revision.” See 
Gates, Jr., supra, at xxiv, 81, 88. 
3 Hurricane Katrina Timeline, CBC News Online (Can.), Sept. 4, 2005, http://www.cbc. 
ca/news/background/katrina/katrina_timeline.html; see Ernest Zebrowski & Judith A. 
Howard, Category 5: The Story of Camille, Lessons Unlearned from America’s 
Most Violent Hurricane 234–36 (2005). Hurricane intensity is measured on the Saffir-
Simpson Hurricane Scale. Zebrowski & Howard, supra, at 223–25. The scale ranges from 
one to five, with a Category One hurricane being the least intense with wind speeds be-
tween 74 and 95 miles per hour, and a Category Five hurricane being the most intense 
with wind speeds exceeding 155 miles per hour. Id. at 249–50. Hurricane Katrina was a 
Category Four storm at 140 miles per hour. Hurricane Katrina Timeline, supra. 
Prior to Katrina, the last storm to cause significant damage to New Orleans was Hurri-
cane Betsy in 1965. See Zebrowski & Howard, supra, at 47–50. However, no storm besides 
Katrina has wielded such destructive force in the United States since the 1928 Okeechobee 
Hurricane, which killed over 3000 people in Florida and Puerto Rico and many hundreds 
more on the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe. See Eliot Kleinberg, Black Cloud: The 
Great Florida Hurricane of 1928, at xiv (2003). The Okeechobee Hurricane caused an 
estimated $80 billion in damage in today’s dollars. Id. at 225. 
4 Rod Amis, Katrina and the Lost City of New Orleans 32 (2005). 
5 John R. Logan, Brown Univ., The Impact of Katrina: Race and Class in Storm-
Damaged Neighborhoods 11–12 tbl.3 (2006), available at http://www.s4.brown.edu/Kat- 
rina/report.pdf. New Orleans is divided into seventeen wards. Gordon Russell, Relatives Often 
Inherit Assessors Powers, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Apr. 6, 2004, at 1. The Lower Ninth 
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this destruction, many of these areas’ residents, though forced out of 
their homes, were unable to evacuate the city immediately due to a lack 
of personal resources.6 A number of residents were unable to leave 
their homes at all, and the death toll ran high as some weathered the 
storm on roof tops and in attics.7 Other residents sought safety in gov-
ernment-established shelters at the Louisiana Superdome and the New 
Orleans Convention Center.8 Both refuges exhibited conditions often 
seen only in developing countries or during times of war, as occupants 
remained for days without adequate food, sanitation, or security.9 Sto-
ries of criminal activity in the shelters, both actual and apocryphal, 
filled the airwaves.10 Media outlets, many of their reporters often safely 
                                                                                                                      
Ward, prior to Hurricane Katrina, was approximately ninety-seven percent black. Douglas 
Brinkley, The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi 
Gulf Coast 258 (2006). The Ninth Ward, located in the easternmost downriver portion of 
the city is the largest and arguably most famous of these wards. See Brinkley, supra, at 255–
61; Greater New Orleans Cmty. Data Ctr., Neighborhoods in Orleans Parish (2004), 
http://www.gnocdc.org/mapping/docs/Neighborhood.pdf [hereinafter New Orleans 
Neighborhood Map]. 
6 Brinkley, supra note 5, at 327–30. One commentator described the early departure 
of those with “cars, money, and good health” as an example of how, in the days immedi-
ately preceding Hurricane Katrina, the strong (the well-to-do) failed to care for the weak 
(those without resources). Id. at 328. 
7 Id. at 163–64. 
8 Id. at 275–76. According to Brinkley’s account, by the Tuesday after the storm, the 
Superdome held over 24,000 people. Id. at 275. 
9 Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in Amer-
ica, 41 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 413, 457 (2006) (remarking that the media images in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina were, for many viewers, disquietly “third-worldish”). Yet 
another observer described the images as evocative of either slavery or slave insurrection, 
and suggested that they “triggered memories of Jim Crow injustice[s]” and other historic 
inequalities suffered by African Americans. Brinkley, supra note 5, at 329–30. 
10 Gary Younge, Murder and Rape—Fact or Fiction?, Guardian (London), Sept. 6, 2005, 
at 5. Various media outlets reported that in the chaos at the New Orleans Superdome in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, two babies had their throats slit, a seven-year-old child 
was raped and murdered, and several corpses were left among piles of excrement. Id. 
None of these stories were ever substantiated. Id. Moreover, media attributions of crime 
may in some cases have depended on whether the actor involved was white or black. See 
Cheryl I. Harris, Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating Culture, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 907, 930–32 
(2006) (reviewing Michael K. Brown et al., Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a 
Color-Blind Society (2003)); Gregory Kane, Two Photos Pose Puzzle: When Is It Not Loot-
ing?, Baltimore Sun, Sept. 3, 2005, at 1B. In one well-publicized case, two photos were 
shown on Yahoo News depicting persons in the aftermath of Katrina carrying food sup-
plies. Harris, supra, at 930; Kane, supra. One of the photos showed a black person with the 
caption: “A young man walks through chest deep waters after looting a grocery store in 
New Orleans.” Harris, supra, at 930. The other showed two white persons and was accom-
panied by the caption: “Two residents wade through chest-deep waters after finding bread 
and soda from a local grocery store after Hurricane Katrina came through the area.” Id. 
Succumbing to reader pressure, Yahoo later removed the photo depicting whites finding 
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ensconced in the mostly white, relatively unaffected French Quarter of 
New Orleans, chronicled the disaster.11 
 These news reports showed mainstream Americans, some of them 
dubious about the continued existence of racial discrimination and in-
creasingly reluctant to address it, a vision of American apartheid in the 
new millennium.12 Cameras scanning the shelters, which had quickly 
deteriorated into little more than human warehouses, rarely showed a 
white face.13 Viewers watched with feelings ranging from stark horror 
to horrid fascination the spectacle of masses of mostly black, mostly 
poor people abandoned together in despair, filth, and chaos.14 One 
                                                                                                                      
food but left the black “looter” along with the original caption. Makani Themba-Nixon, 
Race, Racism and Media: Field Notes from the Frontlines, in Talking the Walk: A Communica-
tions Guide for Racial Justice 5, 9 (Hunter Cutting & Makani Themba-Nixon eds., 
2006). 
11 Hunter Cutting & Makani Themba-Nixon, Katrina Coverage: Race in Your Face, in 
Talking the Walk, supra note 10, at 118, 118; see also Logan, supra note 5, at 12 (noting 
that the French Quarter was only 4.5% black and suffered minimal damage). As one 
commentator observed, reporters for some media outlets often confined themselves to the 
French Quarter in the aftermath of the storm and, as a result, initially reported that little 
damage had been sustained in New Orleans overall. Cutting & Themba-Nixon, supra, at 
118. It took two days for the mainstream press to fully recognize the scope of the disaster. 
Id. 
12 John Powell, Foreword to Talking the Walk, supra note 10, at v (describing the me-
dia portrayal of the “American apartheid”). As one observer noted, “The recent devasta-
tion of Hurricane Katrina revealed the entrenched racial apartheid in America’s cities.” 
Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Death in “Whiteface”: Modern Race Minstrels, Official Lynching, and 
the Culture of American Apartheid, in From Lynch Mobs to the Killing State: Race and 
the Death Penalty in America 150, 175 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 
2006). 
13 See Cutting & Themba-Nixon, supra note 11, at 118–21. 
14 See id. Throughout this article I use the word “black” to refer to people who them-
selves originated in—or a significant number of whose ancestors originated from the con-
tinent of—Africa, and who embrace the social customs and norms associated with this 
ancestry. Just what to call such persons has long been a subject of some debate. F. James 
Davis, Who Is Black? 145–46 (1991). It has been suggested that the transition from “Ne-
gro” and “colored” to “black” and “African American” was a result of the efforts by persons 
of African ancestry in the 1960s to achieve a sense of racial pride. Id. Ultimately, however, 
the word “black,” having become acceptable in public discourse, has remained as the most 
popular choice in written accounts and conversation. See id. at 32. It has been estimated 
that “African American” is used only one out of three times over “black” by blacks them-
selves, and even less often by non-blacks. Gina Philogène, From Race to Culture: The Emer-
gence of African American, in Representations of the Social: Bridging Theoretical 
Traditions 113, 118 (Kay Deaux & Gina Philogène eds., 2001). One likely reason is the 
relative brevity of the word black. I choose it for this reason and because I think that even 
if “black” is not as historically or geographically defining as “African American,” it is 
equally or more culturally defining. 
In this article I use the word “poor” to designate the economically disadvantaged, low-
income population. While I endeavor to use the word in a purely neutral, descriptive 
sense, I recognize that it is a term fraught with “mischievous ambiguity.” A. B. Atkinson, 
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commentator described the televised presentations of the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina and the squalor that many survivors faced as exam-
ples of “disaster pornography.”15 Some less sympathetic viewers likely 
thought the spectacle evocative of the circles of Dante’s Inferno, with 
some commenting, both publicly and privately, that “those people” got 
what they deserved.16 When it was all over, in addition to the loss of 
human life and individual property losses, there were communal 
losses—large portions of neighborhoods that were the bedrock of black 
New Orleans were all but washed away.17 With the neighborhoods went 
                                                                                                                      
Incomes and the Welfare State: Essays on Britain and Europe 94 (1995) (quoting 
the British Poor Law Report of 1834). It has been noted that for much of U.S. history the 
word “poor” conjures two distinct images: the first of the “deserving” poor who lack the 
ability to work, and the second of the “undeserving” or “unworthy” poor who are fully able 
to provide for themselves but choose to exploit charity. Christie W. Kiefer, Health 
Work with the Poor: A Practical Guide 3 (2000). Kiefer defends neither image but 
instead rejects the dichotomy, thus rejecting “the notion that poverty is essentially a matter 
of personal responsibility.” Id. Like Kiefer, I choose to reject the dichotomy, and in doing 
so, I acknowledge the immense multidimensionality of poverty and the way in which it may 
intersect with race, gender, or sexual orientation. See id. 
15 Corey Rayburn, To Catch a Sex Thief: The Burden of Performance in Rape and Sexual As-
sault Trials, 15 Colum. J. Gender & L. 437, 470 (2006). The phrase “disaster pornography” 
has been used to describe the way in which victims suffering in disasters are dehumanized, 
exploited, and reduced to objects of mass media consumption by sensationalized portray-
als. See id. at 468–71. These accounts are characterized by excessive repetition, a focus on 
the grotesque or the obscene, and a complete lack of nuance in reporting the actual prob-
lems of victims. See id.; see also Kenneth Hewitt, Excluded Perspectives in the Social Construction 
of Disaster, in What Is a Disaster?: Perspectives on the Question 75, 87 (E.L. Quaran-
telli ed., 1998). Compare the notion of “dismay of images,” a phrase that describes the way 
in which media portrayals of violence, crime, and disaster distort identity in face-to-face 
relations. See Arthur Kleinman, The Violences of Everyday Life: The Multiple Forms and Dynam-
ics of Social Violence, in Violence and Subjectivity 226, 231–33 (Veena Das et al. eds., 
2000). Distortion occurs because such portrayals appropriate images of the victims, nor-
malize suffering, turn empathetic viewers into voyeurs, and thereby alter the experience of 
social suffering. See id. at 232. 
16 See Carey Hamilton et al., When the Spotlight Fades, Salt Lake City Trib., Mar. 1, 
2006, at A1. One commentator explained this attitude as follows: “Katrina victims are what 
we’ve termed in social work circles the undeserving poor. The hurricane hits and they 
become the symbol for how we focus our resources. They were in the headlines, and we 
could see their poverty and their need.” Id. (quoting Mary Jane Taylor, Associate Professor 
at the School of Social Work, University of Utah). 
In Dante’s Inferno, one of the three books of The Divine Comedy, Hell consists of nine 
concentric descending circles, with each successive descending circle more gruesome or 
harrowing than the previous one. See generally Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy 
(Charles Eliot Norton trans., Encyclopedia Brittanica 1952) (1308-1321). The circles are 
occupied by unrepentant sinners whose sins are punished in an ironic fashion—the sinner 
is inflicted by the chief sin he or she committed for all of eternity. See id. See generally 
W.H.V. Reade, The Moral System of Dante’s Inferno (Kennikat Press 1969) (1909). 
17 See discussion infra Part I. 
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the people and the collective cultural life they infused into their own 
neighborhoods and into the entire city of New Orleans. 
 Thousands of these poor, black New Orleanians were able to flee 
their home city only after Hurricane Katrina had passed, when the 
national and international spotlight sparked enough outrage to con-
vince local and federal authorities to provide some means of escape.18 
The reaction of national leaders to the crisis caused by Hurricane 
Katrina was slow, causing many to excoriate the Bush administration 
for its inadequate response.19 Newsweek published a cover photo show-
ing a tearful black infant, a victim of Hurricane Katrina, with the cap-
tion “Poverty, Race & Katrina Lessons of a National Shame.”20 Rap 
singer Kanye West declared during a nationally televised telethon for 
hurricane victims that “George Bush doesn’t care about black peo-
ple,” sparking a maelstrom of responses, both critical and approv-
ing.21 
 Those escaping the deluge and its aftermath were frequently la-
beled “refugees” by media reports.22 While these persons were not, 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Walter M. Brasch, ‘Unacceptable’: The Federal Response to Hurricane 
Katrina 58–69 (2006). 
19 See id. at 58–65. 
20 Newsweek, Sept. 19, 2005 (cover photograph). 
21 Adrienne T. Washington, Op-Ed., Timidity No Answer to Racism in Katrina Debacle, 
Wash. Times, Sept. 6, 2005, at B2. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated in response 
to West’s remarks that, “Americans don’t want to see Americans suffer. Nobody, especially 
the president, would have left people unattended on the basis of race.” Angela Rozas & 
Howard Witt, The Dreadful Toll, Chi. Trib., Sept. 5, 2005, § 1, at 1. Conversely, Scholar Mi-
chael Eric Dyson argued that Kanye West’s comments suggested that “the government had 
callously broken its compact with its poor black citizens, and that it had forgotten them 
because it had not taken their pain to heart.” Michael Eric Dyson, Come Hell or High 
Water: Hurricane Katrina and the Color of Disaster 28 (2006). However, perhaps 
the most creative expression of approval of West’s comments was a parodic rap written by 
Houston rap group The Legendary K.O. The Legendary K.O., George Bush Doesn’t Care 
About Black People, on C.I.G.A.C. Mixtape (2005), available at http://www.k-otix.com/cigac/ 
komixtape.zip. The song, titled George Bush Doesn’t Care About Black People, and sung to the 
tune of Kanye West’s hit single Gold Digger, is a powerful statement about the loss and pow-
erlessness of poor, black Katrina victims. Id.; Kanye West, Gold Digger, on Late Registra-
tion (Roc-a-Fella Records 2005). For a portion of the lyrics to the song, see Appendix A. 
22 See Hurricane Katrina Turns ‘Refugee’ into Word of the Year, Wash. Post, Dec. 15, 2005, at 
C7. The word refugee was designated a word of the year by the Global Language Monitor, a 
language-monitoring group. Id.; see also Top Word Lists of 2005, Global Language Monitor, 
Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.languagemonitor.com/Top_Word_Lists.html. The group pointed 
to the political storm caused by the use of “refugee” to describe the hundreds of thousands of 
people who fled Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina Turns ‘Refugee’ into Word of the Year, 
supra (“Global Language Monitor head Paul JJ Payack said refugee, which was used five times 
more often than other words to describe those made homeless by Katrina, triggered a debate 
on race and political correctness.”). As a result of complaints by storm victims and their ad-
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strictly speaking, refugees—generally defined as persecuted escapees 
from often dysfunctional countries with no immediate prospect of 
return—in many respects they were adrift and functionally stateless.23 
Some evacuees had never lived anywhere else and had no friends or 
relations on whom to rely outside of their home city.24 A good num-
ber lost vital documents such as government identifications, birth cer-
tificates, and health insurance cards, and hence had great difficulty 
securing services elsewhere in the state or the country.25 Some were 
the victims of scam artists who exploited the evacuees’ lack of docu-
ments, often taking what few funds victims possessed in exchange for 
worthless documentation.26 Others fell prey to identity theft when 
thieves gained access to the social security cards and other vital data 
left behind by their victims in the haste of evacuation.27 
 Those who were last to escape New Orleans often suffered the 
brunt of the storm, were the least able to evacuate to other places, and 
were often unwelcome in their new havens. Some towns and cities ex-
tended only a lukewarm welcome to the escapees.28 Other towns, 
though initially welcoming, soon developed “Katrina fatigue,” or weari-
ness with addressing the concerns of so many continuously needy peo-
ple.29 This was apparently the case in Houston, which probably received 
the bulk of Katrina evacuees.30 There, Rep. John Culberson (R-Tex.) 
proposed “one-strike” legislation, which was directed at evacuees and 
would make it possible to “deport” criminal offenders out of Houston 
and back to their home cities.31 The comments of this legislator re-
flected the widely held, though unsubstantiated, belief that Katrina 
evacuees were largely responsible for Houston’s upsurge in crime dur-
                                                                                                                      
vocates, a number of media outlets switched to the alternate term “evacuee.” See Robert E. 
Pierre & Paul Farhi, ‘Refugee’: A Word of Trouble, Wash. Post, Sept. 7, 2005, at C1. 
23 See id. 
24 See David Ellison, A Tale of Two Cities, Houston Chron., Sept. 19, 2006, at A1. 
25 See Alisa Marie DeMao, Katrina Evacuees Tangled in Red Tape, Fla. Times-Union 
( Jacksonville), Oct. 25, 2005, at B1; Jeb Phillips, Problems Following Evacuees up North, Co-
lumbus Dispatch (Ohio), Sept. 23, 2005, at 1A. 
26 Michelle Hunter, Fake Driver’s Licenses Fuel Arrests, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), 
May 12, 2006, at 1 (reporting that evacuees purchased what turned out to be false driver’s 
licenses in order to secure services in the absence of actual identification documents). 
27 Grant Schulte, Agencies Warn of Scam Artists, Houston Chron., Oct. 6, 2005, at 1. 
28 See, e.g., Jeremy Alford, In One Parish, Divide over Sheltering Newcomers, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 28, 2005, at A24. 
29 See Katy Reckdahl, Desert Storm, Phoenix New Times, July 13, 2006. 
30 See Howard Witt, In Houston, Storm Brews on Evacuees, Chi. Trib., Apr. 26, 2006, § 1, at 
3. Estimates are that over 100,000 Katrina evacuees remained in the Houston metropolitan 
area as of September, 2006. Ellison, supra note 24. 
31 Witt, supra note 30. 
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ing the months following the arrival of the evacuees.32 At least one 
town, apparently viewing the poor, black hurricane evacuees as malig-
nant debris left after the storm, actively refused to provide sanctuary.33 
Many of the Katrina evacuees will be, like actual refugees, permanently 
in exile—they will have great difficulty returning to live in the New Or-
leans of the future. 
B. Many Thousands Gone, Perhaps Never to Return 
 Poor, black New Orleans residents were frequently the last to es-
cape during the evacuation.34 They are now among the last to return to 
New Orleans; in fact, many may never return.35 This delay in movement 
is illustrated by analysis of the first U.S. Census Bureau data showing 
the demographic impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the popu-
lation of the Gulf Coast region.36 In the New Orleans metropolitan 
area, the post-hurricane population was “more white, less poor, and 
more transitory than the pre-hurricane population.”37 It has been sug-
gested that these changes were the result of the disproportionate 
evacuation and slower return of lower-income and black residents from 
the entire metropolitan area after the storms.38 Moreover, researchers 
                                                                                                                      
32 See, e.g., Todd Bensman, Katrina Crime: Perceived or Real?, San Antonio Express-
News, Oct. 29, 2006, at 1A; Peggy O’Hare, Which Came First—The Evacuees or the Crime?, 
Houston Chron., Oct. 22, 2006, at B1. 
33 See 60 Minutes: The Bridge to Gretna (CBS television broadcast Dec. 18, 2005) (tran-
script available on LEXIS, follow News & Business, Combined Sources, Transcripts). 
Armed police from the town of Gretna, Louisiana, which is just over the Mississippi River 
from New Orleans, blocked the only connecting route, a bridge called the Crescent City 
Connection, when hundreds of Katrina evacuees tried to cross on foot in the aftermath of 
the storm. Id. Town officials argued that they were trying to protect the town. Id. Mayor 
Ronnie Harris of Gretna, in response to criticism of the town’s behavior, allegedly stated, 
“This [Hurricane Katrina] was not a 9/11 tragedy with good-heartedness all around. You 
had anarchy and civil disobedience.” Hurricane Katrina: Voices from Inside the Storm: Hearing 
Before the H. Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina, 109th Cong. (2005) (opening statement of Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman, H. Select 
Katrina Response Investigation Comm.). 
34 See Brasch, supra note18, at 9. Many poor and working class people, the majority of 
whom were black, were the last to leave New Orleans chiefly because they had no resources 
to leave. Id. Some resisted leaving in order to safeguard their possessions. Id.; Lou Dobbs 
Tonight: Crisis in Louisiana (CNN television broadcast Sept. 8, 2005) (rush transcript avail-
able at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/08/ldt.01.html). 
35 Logan, supra note 5, at 1. 
36 William H. Frey & Audrey Singer, Brookings Inst., Katrina and Rita Impacts 
on Gulf Coast Populations: First Census Findings 8–11 (2006), available at http://www. 
brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20060607_hurricanes.pdf. 
37 Id. at 8. 
38 Id. at 9, 11. 
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from Brown University have found that if these overwhelmingly poor, 
mostly black evacuees are prevented from returning to their own 
neighborhoods, New Orleans stands to lose approximately eighty per-
cent of its black population.39 
 There are a number of explanations for why poor, black Katrina 
victims failed to return to New Orleans. First, a lack of personal financial 
resources may have prevented many evacuees from returning.40 Addi-
tionally, many evacuees face difficult housing-related barriers. Some of 
the storm victims were the owners of uninsured or underinsured 
houses, and thus have insufficient funds to repair or replace damaged 
homes.41 Others were the owners of only marginally damaged houses 
that have been slated for demolition by city authorities who have made 
little, if any, effort to contact owners.42 Some storm victims were the 
occupants of public housing that, whether reparable or not, has been 
slated for demolition or renovation.43 These former public housing 
occupants have, for the most part, been offered no meaningful alter-
nate housing.44 Still others have been evicted from fully functioning, 
                                                                                                                      
39 Logan, supra note 5, at 1; Ross Frazier, New Orleans Could Lose 80 Percent of Black 
Population, Brown Study Finds, Brown Univ. Daily Herald, Feb. 2, 2006, at 1. 
40 See, e.g., Beaumont, supra note 1; Allan Turner & Eric Berger, Report: Storms Left New 
Human Landscape, Houston Chron.com, June 7, 2006, http://chron.com/disp/story.mpl. 
hurricane/3945689.html. 
41 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
42 The limited efforts of New Orleans authorities to contact homeowners of the demo-
lition list was documented by a number of entities, among them law students at the Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Law School who volunteered to assist storm 
victims in 2005 and 2006. See, e.g., Audio tape: Panel Discussion, Critical Race Praxis: Re-
ports on Race, Rights, and Reconstruction from the Gulf Coast, at Western Law Professors 
of Color Conference, Pale Promises: Confronting the Rights Deficit (Mar. 31, 2006) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Panel Discussion on Race, Rights, and Reconstruction]. One 
student commented about the insistence of the city of New Orleans that it had made a 
good faith effort to reach many of the owners of homes slated for demolition. Id. (com-
ments of Panelist Priscilla Ocen, Student Member of the Critical Race Theory Program, 
UCLA Law School). In the course of a few days’ work, using standard search tools such as 
the Internet, the students had located a number of previously “lost” homeowners. Id. 
43 NBC Nightly News: New Orleans Residents File Lawsuit to Block Demolition of Public Hous-
ing Complexes Damaged by Hurricane Katrina (NBC television broadcast Dec. 8, 2006) (tran-
script available on LEXIS, follow News & Business, Combined Sources, Transcripts). 
44 See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, and Damages at 
2–3, Anderson v. Jackson, No. 06-3298 (E.D. La. June 27, 2006), 2006 WL 2032744. On 
June 27, 2006, former residents of public housing in New Orleans filed a lawsuit alleging 
that a federal plan to demolish four public housing complexes in New Orleans was dis-
criminatory and violated international laws that protect people displaced by natural disas-
ters. Id. at 25–31. The suit was filed by several residents against the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Housing Authority of New Orleans, 
which was effectively taken over by HUD four years ago. Id. at 7, 16–17. 
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privately owned housing units that served the working poor and lower 
middle class before the hurricane.45 Those housing units, like much of 
the housing available in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, are in 
high demand and thus are being re-rented at often significantly higher 
rates.46 Finally, the lack of housing is exacerbated by the desire of local 
authorities to build a “new, improved New Orleans” that excludes “un-
desirables,” that is, poor, black people.47 As a result, large numbers of 
New Orleans’s poor blacks are not likely to resume residency in the city. 
 In the face of so many obstacles to the return of much of New Or-
leans’s black community, a fundamental inquiry arises—what is the re-
course for persons facing housing loss impeding their ability to return 
home? While there are some standard legal remedies for individuals 
facing displacement, the question concerns not just the harms to indi-
vidual housing rights created in the wake of Hurricane Katrina but also 
harms to the evacuees’ right to live where they, and in many cases gen-
erations of their families, have lived for many years.48 Long-term resi-
dency imbues a sense of place involving individual as well as collective 
or communal rights.49 Many of the poor blacks evacuated from New 
Orleans occupied some of the longest-standing and most vibrant black 
communities in the United States. Is there a right to return to and re-
settle these places, and if not, should there be? 
 Generally, U.S. law provides no explicit right of return for persons 
who are displaced internally, meaning within the country.50 Although 
the U.S. Constitution protects freedom of movement and the right to 
travel, there is no explicit right to return to a previous place of habita-
tion, nor has such a right been held to flow from any articulated consti-
                                                                                                                      
45 Sacha Pfeiffer, Landlord with Boston Ties Lashed for Katrina Evictions, Boston Globe, 
Jan. 29, 2006, at A1. 
46 Id. 
47 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
48 The black community in New Orleans has a long history dating back to antebellum 
New Orleans’s large, influential, and propertied free black—or libre—population, which 
was unique in the South. See generally Kimberly S. Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded 
Places: Free Black Society in Colonial New Orleans, 1769-1803 (1997). 
49 See Nadia Lovell, Introduction to Locality and Belonging 1, 1–2 (Nadia Lovell ed., 
1998). Some individuals’ sense of belonging arises from not only the individual memory, 
but also the collective memory associated with a place. Id. at 4. Several sources provide a 
discussion of the politics of the placement and displacement of particular social groups. See 
Irwin Altman & Setha M. Low, Place Attachment: A Conceptual Inquiry, in Place Attach-
ment 1, 1–12 (Irwin Altman & Setha M. Low eds., 1992) (providing an overview of previ-
ous research regarding the characteristics, sources, and roles of place attachment from a 
multi-disciplinary point of view). See generally Suzan Ilcan, Longing in Belonging: The 
Cultural Politics of Settlement (2002). 
50 See discussion infra Parts IV.C, V. 
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tutional right.51 Given this void in U.S. domestic law, I turn to interna-
tional law to find support for a domestic right of return. 
C. What This Article Is About 
 I began this article with a critical account of the aftermath of Hur-
ricane Katrina. This critique serves as the backdrop for a discussion of 
the extent to which there are international laws or norms that give 
poor, black Katrina victims, both as individuals and community mem-
bers, the right to return to and resettle their historical place.52 This ar-
ticle is framed by a discussion of the neighborhoods that were de-
stroyed and an exploration of some housing deprivations suffered by 
Katrina survivors that have led to widespread displacement and dispos-
session. Thereafter the article discusses two of the chief barriers to the 
return of poor blacks to New Orleans: the broad perception of a race-
crime nexus and the effect of the imposition of outsider status on poor, 
black people. Turning to remedies for the dispossession, I explore the 
international law concept of the right of return and its expression as a 
domestic, internal norm and consider how it might be applicable to the 
Katrina victims. While this article considers only the contours of this 
complex and multifaceted issue, it is clear that its significance merits 
further analysis by both theorists and practitioners. Undoubtedly, a 
right of return would help the poor, black former inhabitants of New 
Orleans become a part of their city once more. 
                                                                                                                      
51 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 764 (1966) (Harlan, J. concurring) (“[T]he 
right of ingress and regress . . . is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship under 
the Constitution.” (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) 
(No. 3230))); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (holding that, under the Fifth 
Amendment, a citizen cannot be deprived of the right to travel without due process of 
law). The right to domestic travel is said to have three separate components in the United 
States: “the right of a citizen of one state to enter and leave another State, the right to be 
treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien . . . and, for those travelers who 
elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that 
State.” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500–03 (1999). 
52 Blacks were by no means the only community of color to suffer in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina. See generally Brenda Muñiz, Nat’l Council of La Raza, In the Eye 
of the Storm: How the Government and Private Response to Hurricane Katrina 
Failed Latinos (2006), available at http://www.nclr.org/files/36812_file_WP_Katrina_FNL 
fnl.pdf. Katrina had a devastating impact on the Latino community for two reasons. See id. 
at 4–7, 11. The few sources of relief which were made available during and after the storm 
were sometimes inaccessible to Latinos due to language barriers. See id. at 11. In addition, 
Latino immigrants, both documented and undocumented, were frequently excluded from 
receiving benefits due to uncertainty about their eligibility. See id. at 4–7. 
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I. The Way They Were: New Orleans’s Historic Black 
Neighborhoods 
“I don’t care what people are saying Uptown or wherever they are. This city 
will be chocolate at the end of the day. . . . This city will be a majority Afri-
can-American city. It’s the way God wants it to be.” 
—New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin53 
A. The Lower Ninth Ward 
 New Orleans, despite being subject to the South’s stringent social 
codes separating blacks from whites in most avenues of life, was relatively 
integrated in the period before the U.S. Civil War.54 This social liberality 
ended, however, with the onset of Jim Crow laws.55 The racial division 
originating during this period resulted in the growth of largely black 
neighborhoods.56 Though a number of these primarily black areas sus-
tained significant damage during Hurricane Katrina and in the storm 
that came less than a month later, Hurricane Rita, the best known of the 
black neighborhoods was the Lower Ninth Ward.57 
 The Lower Ninth Ward, often called Lower Nine by New Orleani-
ans, consists of the portion of the Ninth Ward that runs along the 
Mississippi River downriver from the Industrial Canal and stretching to 
the parish of St. Bernard.58 The Lower Ninth Ward has long been known 
for its high number of working-class African American homeowners.59 
However, though much of New Orleans dates back to the eighteenth 
century, the Lower Ninth Ward was one of the last sections of the city to 
                                                                                                                      
53 John Pope, Evoking King, Nagin Calls N.O. ‘Chocolate’ City, Times-Picayune (New Or-
leans), Jan. 17, 2006, at 1. 
54 See, e.g., Craig E. Colten, Basin Street Blues: Drainage and Environmental Equity in New 
Orleans, 1890-1930, 28 J. Hist. Geography 237, 241 (2002) (citing Roger A. Fischer, Racial 
Segregation in Ante Bellum New Orleans, 74 Am. Hist. Rev. 926 (1969), H.W. Gilmore, The Old 
New Orleans and the New: A Case for Ecology, 9 Am. Sociological Rev. 385 (1944), and 
Daphne Spain, Race Relations and Residential Segregation in New Orleans: Two Centuries of 
Paradox, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci., Jan. 1979, at 82). 
55 Id. 
56 See id. at 239–41; Juliette Landphair, Sewerage, Sidewalks, and Schools: The New Orleans 
Ninth Ward and Public School Desegregation, La. Hist., Winter 1999, at 35, 40–41. 
57 See Beaumont, supra note 1. 
58 See New Orleans Neighborhood Map, supra note 5; see also Amis, supra note 4, at 
45; Landphair, supra note 56, at 38–39. 
59 Susan J. Popkin et al., Rebuilding Affordable Housing in New Orleans: The Challenge of Cre-
ating Inclusive Communities, in Urban Inst., After Katrina: Rebuilding Opportunity and 
Equity into the New New Orleans 17, 18–19 (Margery Austin Turner & Sheila R. 
Zedlewski eds., 2006), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311406_after_kat- 
rina.pdf. 
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be developed.60 The area’s poor drainage and relative isolation from the 
rest of the city explains its late development.61 The Lower Ninth Ward 
was created from a cypress swamp, and initially was populated by poor 
blacks and immigrant whites unable to afford housing in other sections 
of New Orleans.62 Some black families date their presence in the area to 
the 1870s, when a number of African American benevolent associations 
and mutual-aid societies organized to provide support for the large 
numbers of freedmen whose recent condition of servitude had left them 
few resources to live on their own.63 From their earliest presence in the 
Lower Ninth Ward, self-help became the watchword for African Ameri-
can families as municipal authorities all but ignored the area’s resi-
dents.64 
 By the early 1920s, a significant portion of the Lower Ninth Ward’s 
residents were black, and they remained underserved by public offi-
cials.65 For example, despite much of the wealth  generated throughout 
New Orleans in the early twentieth century, eighty-six percent of the 
streets in the Lower Ninth Ward remained unpaved as late as the 
1960s.66 For much of its history, the area also lacked proper drainage 
and sewers; a number of homes still used outhouses and poorly in-
stalled septic tanks.67 In September 1965, Hurricane Betsy exacerbated 
these problems; Betsy killed sixty-five people in New Orleans, with its 
most devastating effects felt in the Lower Ninth, much of which was left 
underwater.68 However, despite its limited resources, the Lower Ninth 
Ward was a vibrant neighborhood characterized by an independent 
“can-do” attitude that developed in response to governmental ne-
glect.69 Even in the face of persistent poverty in some areas, by the time 
Hurricane Katrina hit, sixty percent of the homes in the area were 
owner-occupied.70 
                                                                                                                      
60 Amis, supra note 4, at 64. 
61 See id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.; Landphair, supra note 56, at 35, 36–37, 40. 
64 See Craig E. Colten, An Unnatural Metropolis: Wresting New Orleans from 
Nature 114 (2005); Landphair, supra note 56, at 40–41. 
65 E.g., Colten, supra note 64, at 97–98, 114. 
66 Kent B. Germany, “They Can Be Like Other People”: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of 
Alienation in New Orleans’s Early Great Society, in The New Deal and Beyond: Social Wel-
fare in the South Since 1930, at 163, 166–67, 170 (Elna C. Green ed., 2003). 
67 Colten, supra note 64, at 100; Landphair, supra note 56, at 35. 
68 Brinkley, supra note 5, at 59; see Colten, supra note 64, at 145–46, 154. 
69 See Nicolai Ouroussoff, In New Orleans, Each Resident Is Master of Plan to Rebuild, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 8, 2006, at E1; Landphair, supra note 56, at 37, 41, 44. 
70 Popkin et al., supra note 59, at 19. 
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 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed or heavily damaged the vast 
majority of the Lower Ninth Ward’s housing.71 Mandatory evacuations 
of New Orleans resulted in the displacement of a large number of resi-
dents, with many unable to return to their homes or even to New Or-
leans proper.72 Piles of debris, untreated water, lack of electricity, insuf-
ficient housing, and limited public educational facilities and other 
services are only some of the problems that caused and are still causing 
the prolonged absence of former residents.73 The destruction of the 
Lower Ninth Ward meant the loss of more than just individual homes 
and businesses; it was the death of a vital institution. The Lower Ninth 
Ward was not, however, the only predominantly black section of New 
Orleans to experience such overwhelming loss.74 Two other areas, the 
Central City and the Seventh Ward were also hard hit.75 
B. Other Predominantly Black Areas Sustaining Damage:  
The Central City and the Seventh Ward 
 The Central City is a section of New Orleans located just above 
the central business district.76 The section was first developed in the 
1830s and was initially populated by working-class European, mostly 
Irish and Jewish, immigrants.77 Much like the Lower Ninth Ward, the 
Central City is located in a basin so far below sea level that it has long 
been considered marginal land.78 Despite being geographically ill-
favored, the central business district contained theaters, music com-
panies, and publishing houses that were part of a mainstream enter-
tainment industry in the early twentieth century.79 
 The Seventh Ward, located near downtown New Orleans and ex-
tending from Esplanade Avenue to Elysian Fields, is one of the lesser-
known areas of New Orleans yet one of the hardest hit by flooding fol-
                                                                                                                      
71 Logan, supra note 5, at 11 tbl.3 (indicating that 99.9% of the Lower Ninth Ward was 
damaged). 
72 See id. at 1 (“[I]f nobody [is] able to return to damaged neighborhoods . . . New Or-
leans is at risk of losing more than 80% of its black population.”). 
73 Evan Thomas et al., New Orleans Blues, Newsweek, Sept. 4, 2006, at 28, 29. 
74 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
75 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
76 See New Orleans Neighborhood Map, supra note 5. 
77 See Colten, supra note 64, at 91; Robert N. Rosen, The Jewish Confederates 25 
(2000). 
78 See Colten, supra note 64, at 82–83. 
79 See Greater New Orleans Cmty. Data Ctr., Central Business District Neighborhood 
Snapshot, http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/1/47/snapshot.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
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lowing Hurricane Katrina.80 Throughout much of its early history, the 
Seventh Ward was home to Creoles—a term which, when employed in 
the context of New Orleans, refers to persons of mixed black and white 
ancestry.81 Like the Ninth Ward, it was a long-underserved section of 
the city, plagued by poor sewage, poor drainage, overpopulation, and 
frequent attempts by city government to curtail the autonomy of the 
residents.82 Nonetheless, almost since the founding of New Orleans, 
the Seventh Ward Creoles formed their own discrete social group with 
distinctive cuisine and culture.83 Moreover, a number of the city’s best 
known musicians, artists and craftsmen made their homes in the Sev-
enth Ward.84 One of the nation’s most prosperous black business dis-
tricts, the Claiborne Avenue neighborhood, was partly located in the 
Seventh Ward.85 
 In the late 1960s, the business district along Claiborne Avenue was 
destroyed to allow for the new Interstate 10 loop.86 The destruction of a 
large swath of the Ward for the interstate’s construction undermined 
the integrity of the neighborhood.87 While this caused some homeown-
ers to move or abandon their homes, the neighborhood continued to 
house various groups of professionals, including skilled laborers such as 
mechanics, carpenters, and bricklayers.88 More recently, the Seventh 
Ward was home to publicly funded housing complexes including St. 
Bernard, the largest of New Orleans’s housing complexes.89 
                                                                                                                      
80 See Logan, supra note 5, at 11 tbl.3; New Orleans Neighborhood Map, supra note 5. 
81 See Virginia R. Domínguez, White by Definition: Social Classification in 
Creole Louisiana 122 (1986); see also Alice Moore Dunbar-Nelson, People of Color in Lou-
isiana (pt.1), 1 J. Negro Hist. 361 (1916), reprinted in Creole: The History and Legacy 
of Louisiana’s Free People of Color 3, 8–9 (Sybil Klein ed., 2000). 
82 Colten, supra note 64, at 91, 95, 96. 
83 Domínguez, supra note 81, at 125–27. 
84 A number of well-known and lesser-known but highly esteemed jazz musicians of Af-
rican ancestry made their homes in the Seventh Ward, among them Ferdinand “Jelly Roll” 
Morton, often cited as the “inventor” of jazz. Alan Lomax, Mister Jelly Roll: The For-
tunes of Jelly Roll Morton, New Orleans Creole and “Inventor of Jazz,” at xii, xiv, 
70–71 (Random House 1993) (1949). 
85 Tim Wise, Progress and the Eye of the Beholder: Reflections on Race, Class and Truth, Black 
Commentator, July 6, 2006, http://www.blackcommentator.com/190/190_progress_be- 
holder_wise_think_pf.html. 
86 Id. A recent proposal is slated to replace Claiborne Avenue in order to recreate 
some of the black-owned businesses that once thrived there. See Ouroussoff, supra note 69. 
87 Wise, supra note 85. 
88 Domínguez, supra note 81, at 253–55; Wise, supra note 85. 
89 Bill Sasser, Locking out New Orleans’ Poor, Salon.com, June 12, 2006, http://www.sa- 
lon.com/news/feature/2006/06/12/nola_housing/index.html. 
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 The Lower Ninth Ward, the Central City, and the Seventh Ward all 
faced crippling loss in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The suffer-
ing continues even now, long after the storm, as those affected must 
still deal with displacement and dispossession. 
II.  Reasons for the Displacement and Dispossession of Poor, 
Black New Orleanians 
“Whether we like it or not, New Orleans is not going to be 500,000 people 
for a long time. . . . New Orleans is not going to be as black as it was for a 
long time, if ever again.” 
—Housing and Urban Development Secretary Alphonso Jackson90 
A. Voyage of the Undammed: The Plight of the Uninsured  
and the Underinsured 
 Many homes in the range of the storm, and virtually all of those 
that were mortgaged, had homeowner’s insurance coverage.91 None-
theless, a number of poor, black Katrina survivors owning real property 
found themselves in a difficult position in the aftermath of the storm. 
One reason for this is that a number of low-income homeowners, hav-
ing owned their homes long enough to pay off mortgages, were under 
no obligation to purchase either standard homeowner’s insurance or 
flood insurance; thus, many did not.92 For these uninsured homeown-
ers, the only recourse against Katrina damage was to hope for govern-
ment assistance, which in many cases has been slow in arriving.93 Even 
in cases where the homeowners had insurance policies, the payouts 
                                                                                                                      
90 Beaumont, supra note 1. 
91 Cf. Martin F. Grace et al., Catastrophe Insurance: Consumer Demand, Mar-
kets and Regulation 83 & n.14 (2003) (assuming, for purposes of analyzing demand in 
the market for homeowners insurance, that “homeowners insurance . . . is essentially man-
datory”). Mortgage lenders generally require homeowners to purchase and keep in effect 
a policy of homeowner’s insurance prior to closing on the loan. See id. at 108; Popkin et al., 
supra note 59, at 18–19. The lender is named as sole or co-loss payee along with the bor-
rower. See Mary L. Burgner, Assisting Clients in Achieving the American Dream, Mich. Bus. J., 
Jan. 1996, at 44, 46–47. In many cases, the lender collects funds from the mortgagor and 
maintains them in an escrow account in order to make the payments to the insurer, thus 
ensuring compliance with the insurance requirement. See id. at 45–47. 
92 See Popkin et al., supra note 59, at 18, 19. 
93 Richard Wolf, New Orleans Symbolizes U.S. War on Poverty, USA Today, Dec. 22, 2006, 
at A13 (“Since Hurricane Katrina struck on Aug. 29, 2005, only 94 homeowners—and no 
tenants—have received federal aid to rebuild.”). 
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from insurance companies have also been delayed and insufficient for 
full recovery, particularly in the case of black claimants.94 
 Many insurers denied claims made under valid homeowner’s poli-
cies for losses caused by Hurricane Katrina, arguing that the losses were 
caused by flooding resulting from the levee breach and not the hurri-
cane itself.95 While standard homeowner’s policies often cover wind 
and rain, flooding and associated perils are generally excluded from 
such policies and may only be addressed under flood insurance poli-
cies.96 Nonetheless, several lawsuits have been filed to force insurers to 
cover some Katrina losses under standard homeowner’s polices. In 
some cases, such suits argue the doctrine of “efficient proximate cause,” 
which provides that if a covered peril causes an excluded peril, cover-
age is available even for the damage caused by the excluded peril.97 Ac-
cordingly, if high winds, an included peril under many policies, caused 
flooding, then such flooding would be covered.98 Efficient proximate 
cause has been the basis of successful claims by the insured in a num-
ber of jurisdictions, including Louisiana.99 Because of the doctrine’s 
                                                                                                                      
94 Rukmini Callimachi & Frank Bass, Complaints About Insurance Can Pay Off, Houston 
Chron., Oct. 26, 2006, at 3. There is evidence to suggest that residents of black areas who 
actually had insurance and who filed claims under those policies are not being served in 
the same manner as their counterparts in white neighborhoods. Id. An analysis performed 
by the Associated Press (AP) showed that although more than 8000 Louisiana residents 
have filed Katrina-related complaints with the state insurance office, almost seventy-five 
percent of the 3000 insurance cases settled in Louisiana in the first year after Katrina were 
filed by residents currently living in predominantly white areas. Id. Claims filed by house-
holds in majority-black zip codes represented only twenty-five percent of settled claims. Id. 
As a result of the slow response from insurance companies, a number of black claimants 
have given up and accepted amounts representing, in some cases, only a fraction of their 
original claims. Id. The AP analysis also showed that “residents living in white neighbor-
hoods have been three times as likely as homeowners in black areas to seek state help in 
resolving insurance disputes.” Id. 
95 Mitchell F. Crusto, The Katrina Fund: Repairing Breaches in Gulf Coast Insurance Levees, 
43 Harv. J. on Legis. 329, 330–31, 333–34 (2006). 
96 Id. at 334–35. At least one major insurer is seeking to exempt wind and hail from its 
standard homeowners policies in hurricane-prone sections of Louisiana. Mike Hasten, 
Allstate Threatens to Pull out of State, News-Star (Monroe, La.), July 22, 2006, at 1A. Allstate, 
the state’s second largest insurer, threatened to cancel its 30,000 homeowners insurance 
policies with customers in eighteen coastal Louisiana parishes if the state did not allow it to 
make the changes it sought. Id. For a discussion of excluded perils, see generally Crusto, 
supra note 95. 
97 For a further discussion of the doctrine of efficient proximate cause, see Crusto, su-
pra note 95, at 343–44. 
98 See id. 
99 Id. at 344 (citing Assurance Co. of Am. v. Jay-Mar, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 349, 354 
(D.N.J. 1999) and Rhoden v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 907, 912 (S.D. 
Miss. 1998)). 
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success, many insurers had inserted “anti-concurrent causation clauses” 
in their policies, chiefly in response to paying large numbers of claims 
from the devastation of Hurricane Camille in 1969.100 Notwithstanding 
insurers’ efforts to limit the application of efficient proximate cause, a 
number of lawsuits have been filed by homeowners seeking such cover-
age.101 These suits have been met with limited success.102 In one such 
suit, plaintiff Trent Lott, the U.S. Senator from Mississippi, was denied 
coverage under a standard homeowner’s policy. As a result of the de-
nial, Senator Lott filed suit and the insurer moved to dismiss.103 
Though Senator Lott prevailed, the matter continues in litigation. An-
other legislator, Representative Gene Taylor, a Democrat from Missis-
sippi, has also filed suit after being denied coverage by an insurer.104 
                                                                                                                      
100 Spencer M. Taylor, Insuring Against the Natural Catastrophe After Katrina, Nat. Re-
sources & Env’t, Spring 2006, at 26, 27. “Anti-concurrent causation clauses provide that 
the insurer will not pay if one of the causes was an excluded loss, even if there are several 
enumerated causes that played a role in a loss.” Crusto, supra note 95, at 344. 
101 See, e.g., Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 05-CV-559-LTS-JMR, 2006 WL 
1442489, at *3 (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2006) (noting plaintiff’s allegation that wind was the 
proximate cause of damage to their property in Hurricane Katrina); Buente v. Allstate 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 05-CV-712-LTS-JMR, 2006 WL 980784, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 12, 
2006) (noting plaintiff’s allegation that storm surge was the cause of damage to their 
property in Hurricane Katrina and that storm surge was not an excluded peril). Home-
owners in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes commenced a class action against the Louisiana 
Insurance Commissioner and numerous insurers to obtain a declaration that the flooding 
was dominantly and efficiently caused by levee breaches and thus by negligence and wind-
storm, not by the flood exclusion. Class Action Petition for Declaratory Judgment and 
Mandamus at 3–6, Chehardy v. Wooley, No. 536451 (La. Jud. Dist. Ct. Sept. 16, 2005), 2005 
La. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 5, at *4–8, *9–10. 
102 Guice v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No.1:06CV001 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (Mem.), avail-
able at http://www.mssd.uscourts.gov/Insurance%20Opinions/ch06cv1orderA0322.pdf (de-
nying certification of a class in a suit against State Farm brought by policyholders whose 
claims were rejected following Hurricane Katrina). 
103 See Lott v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:05-CV-671-LTS-RH, 2006 WL 2728695 at 
*1 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 19, 2006). In response, in June 2006, Senator Lott and Senator Mark 
Dayton, a Democrat from Minnesota, proposed a bill, colloquially termed “Honesty is the 
Best Insurance Policy,” which would require the language of insurance policies to be in 
plain English. Uniform Insurance Non-Coverage Disclosure Act, S. 3239, 109th Cong. § 2 
(2006); Nomi Prins, Op-Ed., Don’t Let Insurers Shirk Responsibility, Newsday (N.Y.), Aug. 30, 
2006, at A33. Though the coverage problem was widespread and has caused many to file 
suit against insurers, some have speculated that because the insurance industry is one of 
the biggest donors to politicians’ coffers, there is little support in Congress for any change 
that would harm the interests of insurers. Ana Radelat, Congress Unlikely to Help in Insurance 
Fights, Gannett News Serv., Sept. 6, 2006 (on file with author). 
104 Ana Radelat, Congress Targets Katrina Claims, Clarion-Ledger ( Jackson, Miss.), Jan. 
19, 2007, at 1A. Taylor is also chair of the House Democratic Caucus Hurricane Katrina 
Task Force, which advocates a number of proposals, among them “ending the insurance 
industry’s limited antitrust exemption” under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, “requiring 
homeowners’ policies to cover all perils, and creating a federal regulator to provide over-
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 Separate flood polices are offered either by private insurers or, 
more often, by the government in markets that face extreme flood 
risk.105 In 1968 Congress created the National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram (NFIP) in response to the rising cost of taxpayer-funded disaster 
relief for flood victims and the increasing amount of damage caused by 
floods.106 The NFIP makes federally backed flood insurance available in 
communities that agree to adopt and enforce floodplain management 
ordinances to reduce future flood damage.107 A large number of poli-
cies made available through the NFIP are administered by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a unit of the Department of 
Homeland Security.108 Only owners in participating communities may 
purchase coverage, and generally this participation is based on an 
agreement between the local community and the federal govern-
ment.109 Because flood insurance is largely unavailable in standard 
homeowner’s policies, the NFIP, which sells policies directly or through 
individual agents, assumes all risk of damages in the case of a flood.110 
 Notwithstanding government backing, flood insurance policies 
are often among the most expensive types of insurance offered to 
homeowners.111 The exorbitant cost of such policies means that many 
                                                                                                                      
sight of the industry.” House Democrats’ Katrina Panel Calls for Federal Insurance Oversight, 
BestWire, Oct. 20, 2006 (on file with author). For a broad discussion of the homeowner’s 
insurance problems faced by Hurricane Katrina victims, see generally Crusto, supra note 
95. 
105 See generally Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood Insurance Program: A U.S. Ap-
proach to Flood Loss Reduction, in Flood Issues in Contemporary Water Management 
185, 185–86 ( Jiri Marsalek et al. eds., 2000). 
106 Id. at 185. For a broad discussion of the impact of the NFIP, see generally Raymond 
J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise 
Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci., Mar. 2006, 
at 171. 
107 Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency (FEMA), Answers to Questions About the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Program 1 (2006), available at http://www.fema.gov/library/ 
viewRecord.do?id=1404 (follow “View/Download/Print” hyperlink to access PDF file). 
108 Id. at 1–2. 
109 See id. at 9; Mark A. Riebau, The Importance of Maps for Floodplain Management and 
Flood Insurance, in Flood Issues in Contemporary Water Management, supra note 105, 
at 167, 168. 
110 FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program Flood Insurance Manual: Gen-
eral Rules, at GR-1 to GR-2 (2006), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/nfip/manual 
200610/03gr.pdf; see also Pasterick, supra note 105, at 189–90; Riebau, supra note 109, at 
111.S 
111 For a discussion of the allocation of flood risk and the cost of such coverage, see 
Robert Rhee, Catastrophic Risk and Governance After Hurricane Katrina: A Postscript to Terrorism 
Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 581, 597–600 (2007). 
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homeowners choose to forgo flood coverage.112 It has been reported 
that roughly half the damaged properties in Louisiana were covered 
by flood insurance.113 A large number of poor, black New Orleanians 
were among those lacking flood insurance.114 Moreover, another sig-
nificant factor in the lack of flood insurance in the heavily African 
American Ninth Ward is that, prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA had 
termed much of the Lower Ninth Ward “low risk” because it was lo-
cated on relatively high ground and was expected to be protected by 
the levees.115 In summary, many poor, black New Orleanians have 
been unable to recover and rebuild because they are either uninsured 
or, if they carry insurance at all, have insufficient coverage. 
B. The Threat of Wrongful Demolition 
 In the immediate aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, a 
number of the homes owned or occupied by evacuees were marked as 
nuisances by the city and slated for demolition.116 Demolition by local 
authorities in such circumstances is permitted under the general police 
power granted to states.117 However, in order for governmental authori-
ties to act and demolish a structure, there must in fact be a nuisance.118 
Owners of properties destroyed as nuisances are not granted compen-
sation for those properties, as owners of properties taken for public use 
are.119 Yet owners may contest the finding of nuisance in cases of pend-
ing demolition through a public hearing, after proper notice is  given.120 
                                                                                                                      
112 See Jonathan P. Hooks & Trisha B. Miller, The Continuing Storm: How Disaster Recovery 
Excludes Those Most in Need, 43 Cal. W. L. Rev. 21, 28–29 (2006) (“[G]iven their financial 
constraints, many elderly, fixed-income, and low-income households simply do not pur-
chase or maintain insurance.”). 
113 E.g., When Government Fails—Katrina’s Aftermath, Economist, Sept. 10, 2005, at 25, 28. 
114 See Hooks & Miller, supra note 112, at 34–35. 
115 Popkin et al., supra note 59, at 19. 
116 Joe Gyan, Jr., N.O. Officials Promise Not to Seize Property, Advocate (Baton Rouge, 
La.), Aug. 4, 2006, at A1. 
117 See Freeman v. City of Dallas, 242 F.3d 642, 652 (5th Cir. 2001); James v. City of Dal-
las, No. 3:98-CV-436-R, 2003 WL 22342799, at *18 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2003), aff’d 115 F. 
App’x 205 (5th Cir. 2004). 
118 See Freeman, 242 F.3d at 652–53 (“[A] city may not arbitrarily enter abatement or-
ders or declare the existence of nuisances with no underlying standards.”). 
119 See Willard v. City of Eugene, 550 P.2d 457, 459 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). Actions for 
wrongful demolition or actions to enjoin such acts by a governmental entity are distinct 
from actions for inverse condemnation. See id. at 460 (denying plaintiff’s inverse condem-
nation claim but implying that the facts of the case may have been sufficient to prove the 
tort of wrongful demolition). An action for wrongful demolition typically contests a find-
ing by governmental authorities that a property is a nuisance and seeks damages for the 
removal or destruction of the edifice. In contrast, an inverse condemnation claim requires 
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 The issue of notice creates the major problem for poor, black New 
Orleanian homeowners. As a group of law students from the University 
of California at Los Angeles reported, New Orleans officials very often 
indicated that houses were set for destruction by physically marking 
them with fluorescent paint or by publishing details in local newspapers 
and referencing GPS coordinates instead of addresses.121 None of these 
forms of notice, of course, was likely to give actual notice to displaced 
homeowners, who were thousands of miles from New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina, that their homes were slated for demolition. 
C. Eviction from Public Housing 
 Tenants who live in public housing or a federally subsidized 
apartment complex generally enjoy greater protection against eviction 
than most other tenants.122 However, protections are limited, and hous-
ing authorities who assert that units are unsafe or uninhabitable usually 
prevail in removing tenants.123 Moreover, if public housing is renovated 
or revitalized, residents have no constitutional right to remain after re-
vitalization of their residential units.124 
 Many residents who had occupied public housing units were left 
with no immediate place of residence.125 Many tenants fear that units 
that remain unoccupied will be gentrified to produce mixed-income 
units, thus permanently displacing the former residents.126 These fears 
are well-founded if the previous actions of housing officials are any in-
dication of their future intent.127 Replacement of older public housing 
                                                                                                                      
an assertion that private property was taken for public use without compensation. See id. at 
459. 
120 See Wantanabe Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 159 F. App’x 235, 237–38 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
121 See Joe Gyan, Jr., N.O. Serves Notice on Property, Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), Feb. 
21, 2006, at A1; Panel Discussion on Race, Rights, and Reconstruction, supra note 42. 
122 See Evictions from Certain Subsidized and HUD-Owned Projects, 24 C.F.R. § 247 
(2006); Shelby D. Green, The Public Housing Tenancy: Variations on the Common Law that Give 
Security of Tenure and Control, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev. 681, 732–33 (1994). Generally, eviction 
from public housing units must be for “good cause,” including but not limited to material 
noncompliance with the rental agreement, material failure to carry out obligations under 
any state tenancy laws, or certain types of criminal activity. 24 C.F.R. § 247.3(a). 
123 See 24 C.F.R. § 247.5, .10; Green, supra note 122, at 730–34. 
124 Reese v. Miami-Dade County, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1301, 1306–09 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
125 Susan Saulny, Residents Clamoring to Come Home to Projects in New Orleans, N.Y. Times, 
June 6, 2006, at A14. 
126 Id. 
127 See Andrew Rice, The Suburban Solution, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 
114. 
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with mixed-income units has been a major result of a federal program 
called Hope VI.128 
 Hope VI was designed to revitalize the nation’s most damaged and 
dilapidated public housing.129 Envisioned as a “New Urbanism” ap-
proach to public housing, Hope VI used a combination of public and 
private dollars to underwrite the costs of reconstructing public hous-
ing.130 The funds provided for the construction of conventional subsi-
dized apartments for low-income families, along with market rate 
apartments and private town homes.131 Across the United States, 
mixed-income developments were built where public housing devoted 
to the poor once stood.132 As a result of Hope VI, New Orleans resi-
dents who had lived in now-demolished housing projects were 
“vouchered–out,” or given Housing Choice (Section 8) vouchers that 
were often difficult to use because of the dearth of landlords who 
choose to accept the subsidies.133 In the 1990s, the residents of the St. 
                                                                                                                      
128 See id. In 1992, under an annual appropriations act, Congress established the Urban 
Revitalization Development program, also known as HOPE VI (Homeownership and Op-
portunity for People Everywhere). Department of Veteran Affairs and Housing and Urban 
Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-
389, tit. II, 106 Stat. 1571, 1579–81 (1992) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437v 
(2000)). 
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437v(a). 
130 Id. § 1437v(e)(2)(G); Ngai Pindell, Is There Hope for HOPE VI?: Community Economic 
Development and Localism, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 385, 387, 420–22 (2003). For a discussion of the 
effects of HOPE VI, see Diane K. Levy & Deborah R. Kaye, Metro. Hous. & Cmtys. 
Ctr., Urban Inst., How Are HOPE VI Families Faring?: Income and Employment 
(Series Policy Brief No. 4, 2004). New Urbanism is a design and planning theory founded 
on assertions about the nature and scope of “traditional” American cities. See Emily Talen, 
New Urbanism and American Planning: The Conflict of Cultures 1–2 (2005). New 
Urbanism attempts to bring together the multiple strands of urbanism such as “diversity, 
equity, community, connectivity, and the importance of civic and public space.” Id. at 2–3. 
131 Arthur M. Wolfson, Lost in the Rubble: How the Destruction of Public Housing Fails to Ac-
count for the Loss of Community, 9 Chap. L. Rev. 51, 63 (2005). 
132 Id.; Nat’l Hous. Law Project, False HOPE: A Critical Assessment of the 
HOPE VI Public Housing Redevelopment Program 10–11 (2002), available at http:// 
www.nhlp.org/html/pubhsg/FalseHOPE.pdf [hereinafter False HOPE]. 
133 E.g., Rhonda Bell, Apartments Scarce for Section 8 Renters, Times-Picayune (New Or-
leans), June 6, 2000, at B1. In some regions, housing vouchers would provide landlords 
with substantially the same rent as rent paid via private funds, but there is a chronic short-
age of landlords who will accept the vouchers. See Pindell, supra note 130, at 430–32. As 
one commentator writes, “[t]he idea that the availability and quality of housing will be 
determined solely by the ability of persons seeking housing to pay rent at market rates . . . 
[t]o a great extent . . . is false.” Green, supra note 122, at 685. This is the case because of-
ten property owners refuse to enter into landlord-tenant relationships based on non-
monetary factors that are not necessarily reflective of economic rationality, such as “racism, 
low-income status, family composition, and receipt of public benefits.” Id. (citing James A. 
Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 
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Thomas project in New Orleans found themselves “vouchered-out” 
when their building was demolished under Hope VI.134 The St. Thomas 
project has become the prototype for the future of public housing in 
New Orleans, as planners envision a wide-scale implementation of 
mixed-use, market-rate developments.135 
 Before Hurricane Katrina, Hope VI was slated for termination.136 
Proponents of the program argue that it has led to the revitalization of 
neighborhoods all over the United States and want to see it applied to 
the renewal of public housing in post-Katrina New Orleans.137 Critics of 
the program point to several flaws.138 Primarily, the Hope VI plan leaves 
many former housing residents without adequate housing.139 In New 
Orleans and beyond, Hope VI, in its zeal to create mixed-use neighbor-
hoods, has ignored the bonds formed among residents of public hous-
ing and in so doing has destroyed the sense of community forever.140 
The offer of vouchers instead of newly renovated housing has been up-
held as a permissible government response to the problem of housing 
shortages for the poor.141 Unfortunately, even in cases where renovated 
                                                                                                                      
Vand. L. Rev. 1049, 1050–51 (1989)). For a discussion of “vouchering out” the poor in the 
context of post-Katrina New Orleans, see Mike Davis, Gentrifying Disaster, Mother Jones, 
Oct. 25, 2005, available at http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2005/10/ 
gentrifying_disaster.html. 
In view of the international human rights norms discussed in later sections of this arti-
cle, it may be interesting to consider the extent to which Hope VI or similar programs that 
require public housing residents to move and that result in gentrification may be viewed as 
arbitrarily forced relocation under international norms. See Marco Simons, The Emergence of 
a Norm Against Arbitrary Forced Relocation, 34 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 95, 98–103 (2002). 
Forced relocation includes not only the most egregious human rights violations such as 
internment in concentration camps, but also “the assertion of control over populations 
(especially those of persecuted ethnic minority groups)” and “the relocation of popula-
tions out of areas designated for resource exploitation or off of lands that they do not 
own.” Id. at 104. 
134 Davis, supra note 133. 
135 E.g., Gwen Filosa, Public Housing Still Empty, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Apr. 9, 
2006, at 1; Davis, supra note 133. 
136 See Rob Nelson, Fischer Low-Rise Set to Be Razed, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Feb. 
28, 2003, at A1 (noting that in 2003, “President Bush [sought] to end the 10-year-old fed-
eral HOPE VI program, which his administration [said was] riddled with inefficiency and 
poor planning by local authorities.”). 
137 Gwen Filosa, 4 Housing Complexes Will Be Demolished, Times-Picayune (New Or-
leans), June 15, 2006, at A1. 
138 See generally False HOPE, supra note 132. 
139 Id. at 7–15. For a further discussion of Hope VI and its impact on communities and 
the availability of housing for the poor, see generally Pindell, supra note 130, and Wolfson, 
supra note 131. 
140 Wolfson, supra note 131, at 69–70. 
141 Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 339 F.3d 702, 714 (8th Cir. 
2003) (finding that even if Congress intended to require HOPE VI grant recipients to 
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housing reopens in the same communities, there is no guarantee that 
former residents will have access to the new units.142 
D. Market Response Eviction from Private Housing 
 Eviction from privately owned housing, or the forced removal from 
leased premises by a landlord or his agents, is usually governed by state 
and local statutes.143 In many jurisdictions, landlords may evict tenants 
at the end of a lease term without cause, as long as the landlord uses the 
appropriate legal process and adheres to procedural requirements.144 
There are some jurisdictions where laws bar all but “just cause” evictions, 
with just cause defined either by the terms of the lease, case law, or a 
statute that enumerates permissible reasons for eviction.145 Louisiana, 
however, is not such a jurisdiction. The lack of “just cause” regulation 
allows for what I have here termed “market response eviction.” 
 By market response eviction, I mean those evictions that take place 
in an economic climate wherein it is more economically rewarding for 
landlords to evict current tenants and seek new tenants who are able to 
pay much higher rates. In cases where the increase in rent is exorbitant, 
this is sometimes referred to as price-gouging.146 The issue of large rent 
increases versus tenant hardship has been described in a number of 
jurisdictions as the dilemma between “fair rent,” or rents that achieve 
long-term equilibrium in landlord returns despite limited supply, and 
“forced subsidy,” which involves rent control legislation that seems to 
place the burden of rental market failures on the landlord.147 Gener-
ally, rent control legislation has been upheld, particularly in times of 
                                                                                                                      
provide replacement housing for all displaced tenants, the housing authority met this re-
quirement by offering all displaced tenants Section 8 housing vouchers). 
142 See id. at 714–15 (rejecting the contention that a refurbished housing project was 
required to provide space for all former tenants). 
143 See P. A. Agabin, Annotation, Right of Landlord Legally Entitled to Possession to Dispossess 
Tenant Without Legal Process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177, §§ 1, 5 (1966). 
144 See id. § 5. 
145 See, e.g., New Jersey Anti-Eviction Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 2000). 
146 See generally Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the Legal and 
Economic Aspects of Post-Disaster Price Regulation, 94 Ky. L.J. 535 (2005–2006); Richard A. 
Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 741 (1988). 
147 See, e.g., Timothy L. Collins, “Fair Rents” or “Forced Subsidies” Under Rent Regulation: 
Finding a Regulatory Taking Where Legal Fictions Collide, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 1293, 1294 (1996); 
Michael D. Bergman, Recent Development, Property Law: Recent Developments in Rent Control 
and Related Laws Regulating the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 1989 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 
691, 734–36 (1989). 
2007] A Domestic Right of Return in New Orleans in the Aftermath of Katrina 349 
emergency shortage.148 Since Katrina, over 450 complaints of housing-
related price-gouging have been lodged with the office of Louisiana 
Attorney General Charles Foti, Jr.149 However, because rent-based price-
gouging is not covered explicitly by Louisiana law, the Attorney General 
has not filed any charges.150 A bill introduced in the Louisiana legisla-
ture is designed to end the practice by making “unfair residential rent 
increases” in hurricane-damaged areas illegal.151 
 Despite efforts to address the problem of exorbitant rents, the 
problem continues over a year after the hurricane.152 According to data 
collected by the Brookings Institution, the fair market value of a two-
bedroom apartment in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina has risen 
by thirty-nine percent, meaning that the average price of a two-bed-
room apartment has risen from $676 to $940 per month.153 This in-
crease in rental price was left largely unameliorated by the actions of 
the government.154 For example, the Louisiana Recovery Authority has 
set aside $7.5 billion to help homeowners with property recovery efforts 
and $859 million to assist landlords.155 No funds or economic benefits 
have been slated for direct delivery to tenants.156 Hence, while land-
lords have been able to restore some of their properties and re-rent 
them, often at the new, higher rates, tenants whose rental housing was 
destroyed have received little funding to find housing in the higher-
priced market.157 
                                                                                                                      
148 See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921) (upholding a rent control ordi-
nance on the theory that World War I had created an economic emergency that “clothed 
the letting of buildings in the District of Columbia with a public interest so great as to jus-
tify regulation by law”). 
149 Michael Kunzelman, After Katrina, Low-Income Tenants Fight Eviction, Mobile Regis-
ter (Ala.), Apr. 19, 2006, at A6. 
150 Id. 
151 Jake Wagman, Survivors of Katrina Strive to Set Down Roots Nine Months Later, St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, May 30, 2006, at A1. 
152 Amy Liu et al., Brookings Inst., Special Edition of the Katrina Index: A One-
Year Review of Key Indicators of Recovery in Post-Storm New Orleans 4 (2006), 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20060822_katrina.pdf. 
153 Id. at 4, 5. 
154 See Susan Saulny & Gary Rivlin, Renewal Money Bypasses Renters in New Orleans, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 17, 2006, at 14. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 See id. 
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III. Other Barriers to the Return of Poor Blacks to New Orleans 
A. “Cleaning up the Ghetto”: The Conflation of Race and Crime  
in Urban Neighborhoods 
We finally cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn’t do it. 
But God did. 
—Representative Richard Baker, Republican Congressman from 
Baton Rouge158 
 One of the significant barriers to the return of poor blacks to New 
Orleans is a notion that these persons were undesirable elements in the 
community. As one observer suggested, “If we’re going to try to recre-
ate the city, why not do it right? Why rebuild it the way it was? New Or-
leans was a dangerous city even before the hurricane hit.”159 Comments 
such as these, expressing an open Schadenfreude at the evacuation and 
slow return of poor blacks,160 reflect notions held by many white and 
economically well-off New Orleanians—that there is conflation between 
race, crime, and urban residency, and that the face of crime in New Or-
leans is black. 
 Accordingly, the widespread evacuation of many poor blacks who 
previously resided in New Orleans is viewed as the beginning of a “dis-
                                                                                                                      
158 Susan Saulny, Residents Clamoring to Come Home to Projects in New Orleans, N.Y. Times, 
June 6, 2006, at A14. 
159 Haya El Nasser, A New Orleans Like the Old One Just Won’t Do, USA Today, Sept. 19, 
2005, at 15A. 
160 “Schadenfreude” is a German word, usually capitalized, signifying a malicious or 
perverse pleasure in the misfortune of others. 16 Oxford English Dictionary 611 (2d 
ed. 1989). It has been imported to English directly in its German form, as it is often said to 
have no true English equivalent. But see Peter Novobatzky & Ammon Shea, Insulting 
English 51 (2001) (defining “epicaricacy,” an English word of apparently similar mean-
ing, but appearing in few modern dictionaries). In some of its earliest scholarly usage, 
Schadenfreude focused upon considerations of interpersonal relations. See generally Fritz 
Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (1958); Friedrich Nietzsche, 
On the Genealogy of Morals 127 (Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter Kaufmann & R. J. Holl-
ingdale trans., Vintage Books 1989) (1887). In more recent scholarly usage, it has moved 
beyond the interpersonal to the broader context of intergroup relations, particularly 
where there are feelings of scorn or superiority held by one group towards another, and 
for this reason, it has a particular piquancy in the context of some mainstream white atti-
tudes held about poor, black Katrina victims. See Russell Spears & Colin Wayne Leach, In-
tergroup Schadenfreude: Conditions and Consequences, in The Social Life of Emotions 336, 
336–38 (Larissa Z. Tiedens & Colin Wayne Leach eds., 2004). Spears and Leach argue that 
Schadenfreude is an important aspect of group social identity because of the way that it 
implies both “psychological distance” from and “emotional divergence” between one group 
and another. Id. at 338. 
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aster dividend,” or an unexpected bonus arising from the adversity.161 
This dividend has helped to hasten the “urban renewal” process that 
has been part of the fabric of New Orleans and other American cities 
since the 1950s, resulting in such wholesale elimination of communities 
of color, especially black communities, that it is often cynically called 
“negro removal.”162 
 This process of eliminating blacks from the urban fabric reflects 
anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss’ work on societies’ response to dif-
ference.163 Lévi-Strauss suggests that societies use two mechanisms for 
addressing the “otherness” of Others: anthropoemic (expelling the 
Other) or anthropophagic (swallowing or appropriating the Other).164 
In primitive societies these devices were often literal and were seen in 
the use of exile and cannibalism.165 Lévi-Strauss argues that these 
strategies of domination are mutually exclusive.166 More recent com-
mentators have viewed the anthropophagic and anthropoemic proc-
esses as coexisting mechanisms, which may function at the same time in 
societies although they may be in the province of differing institutions 
or may only be applied to certain segments of the population.167 
                                                                                                                      
161 See, e.g., Ashok Malik, The Disaster Dividend, Indian Express (Mumbai), Oct. 31, 
2005, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/archive_full_story.php?con- 
tent_id=81079 (arguing that the massive October 8, 2005 earthquake in Jammu and Paki-
stan-occupied Kashmir might have the benefit of helping to bring peace the region). The 
disaster dividend may be compared in some respects to the notion of a “peace dividend.” 
Todd Sandler & Keith Hartley, The Economics of Defense 277–79 (1995). A peace 
dividend refers, in the most basic sense, to the reallocation of spending from military pur-
poses to other budget categories that are perceived as peacetime expenditures. Id. at 277. 
It has been noted that this view of the peace dividend is simplistic and fails to take into 
account the often complex and slow-moving process of such reallocations. Id. Similarly, a 
disaster dividend, while popularly conceived as an almost instantaneous materialization of 
a benefit after a disaster or emergency, may in fact be much slower in manifesting itself. 
162 Thomas J. Campanella, Urban Resilience and the Recovery of New Orleans, 72 J. Am. 
Planning Ass’n 141, 144 (2006); see also Charles C. Euchner & Stephen J. McGovern, 
Urban Policy Reconsidered: Dialogues on the Problems and Prospects of Ameri-
can Cities 101 (2003); David Hilfiker, Urban Injustice: How Ghettos Happen 6–11 
(2002); Philip M. Hauser & Mary B. Wirth, Relocation—Opportunity or Liability?, in Poverty 
in America 349, 360–61 (Margaret S. Gordon ed., 1965). 
163 See Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques 287–88 ( John Weightman & Doreen 
Weightman trans., 1992) (1955). 
164 Zygmunt Bauman, Uses and Disuses of Urban Space, in Organizing Metropolitan 
Space and Discourse 15, 24 (Barbara Czarniawska & Rolf Solli eds., 2001) (citing Lévi-
Strauss, supra note 163). 
165 Id. 
166 See id. 
167 See Zygmunt Bauman, Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality 
179–81 (1995); Stanley Cohen, Visions of Social Control: Crime, Punishment and 
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 These mechanisms are often present in modern society in “up-
graded” or “refined” forms via the appropriation of cultural artifacts or 
other attributes of the Other, spatial separation, the establishment of 
urban ghettos, and measures that make it impracticable for the dis-
placed to return to their former homes.168 Indeed, the final mechanism 
may be at work in the case of blacks in New Orleans. Yet Hurricane 
Katrina is not the first time that the dislocation and destruction caused 
by a major disaster has driven some dominant white interests to seek 
the removal of a community of color. 
 Probably the best known historical example of a post-disaster effort 
to eliminate a community of color was seen in San Francisco’s China-
town following the earthquake of 1906.169 The 1906 earthquake was of 
immense proportions, estimated to have been at 8.3 on the Richter 
Scale.170 The earthquake and subsequent fire that it caused damaged 
much of the city.171 Chinatown, centrally located on a hill in one of the 
prime commercial quarters of San Francisco, was all but destroyed by 
the earthquake.172 City leaders, and even out-of-town critics, immedi-
ately reprised attempts from the 1870s to move Chinatown from its cen-
tral, geographically favorable location to a more marginal neighbor-
hood.173 
 In the wake of the destruction caused by the earthquake in San 
Francisco, it was argued that the entire neighborhood should be relo-
cated, for the “safety” and “happiness” of the Chinese themselves, and 
                                                                                                                      
Classification 218–19, 234 (1985); Jock Young, The Exclusive Society: Social Ex-
clusion, Crime and Difference in Late Modernity 56–57 (1999). 
168 May Joseph, Nomadic Identities: The Performance of Citizenship 131–32 
(1999) (discussing “ideological cannibalism” and the way in which postcolonial societies 
consume the cultural corpus of Others as an exercise in state-building). Although Lévi-
Strauss seemed to see the two impulses as being starkly opposed and viewed “primitive” 
societies as anthropoemic and modern societies as anthropophagic, Bauman sees both 
impulses in modern society. Bauman, supra note 167, at 179–81; Lévi-Strauss, supra note 
163, at 287–88. 
169 See generally Philip L. Fradkin, The Great Earthquake and Firestorms of 1906: 
How San Francisco Nearly Destroyed Itself 289–304 (2005). 
170 Ann Weil, Earthquakes 24 (2004). The Richter magnitude test scale, more 
accurately described as the local magnitude ML scale, was developed in 1935 and credited 
to Charles Richter. Id. at 4; see Bruce A. Bolt, Engineering Seismology, in Earthquake Engi-
neering: From Engineering Seismology to Performance-Based Engineering 2-1, 2-13 
to 2-15 (Yousef Bozorgnia & Vitelmo V. Bertero eds., 2004). The scale uses a base ten 
logarithmic scale to assign a single number to quantify the size of an earthquake. Bolt, 
supra, at 2-13. Approximating tools have allowed scientists to assign the 1906 San Francisco 
earthquake a place on the scale. Id. 
171 Fradkin, supra note 169, at 3–4. 
172 Id. at 34–35, 289. 
173 Id. at 34–37. 
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to eliminate the “blight” that Chinatown had caused to the central 
city.174 But for the intervention of the Dowager Empress in China, San 
Francisco’s Chinatown would have been rebuilt on a vastly smaller scale 
with fewer inhabitants on the mudflats near the city’s slaughter-
houses.175 Like the Chinese in San Francisco in 1906, the poor blacks in 
post-Katrina New Orleans face dispossession and dislocation.176 Desires 
to reduce the number of certain people in order to fight urban blight 
or crime stand as one of the most insurmountable barriers to the re-
newal of neighborhoods chiefly occupied by blacks and especially poor 
blacks.177 Unfortunately, no powerful defender, either in the United 
States or abroad, has thus far stepped forward to aid black New Or-
leanian efforts to reestablish their neighborhoods. 
B. The Race, Crime, and Urban Residency Triad 
“Some of the people shouldn’t return.” . . . “The (public housing) develop-
ments were gang-ridden by some of the most notorious gangs in this coun-
try. People hid and took care of those persons because they took care of them. 
Only the best residents should return. Those who paid rent on time, those 
who held a job and those who worked.” 
—Housing and Urban Development Secretary Alphonso 
Jackson178 
 One of the principal reasons for the undesirability of poor, black 
Katrina victims is the belief, expressed by public figures and private ac-
tors, of a significant link between the black, mostly poor inhabitants of 
New Orleans and high crime rates.179 Therefore, the story goes, the 
evacuation of poor, black areas and the subsequent destruction of hous-
ing which make broad reoccupation impossible means a reduction in 
crime rate in New Orleans because the “criminals” were cleaned out by 
                                                                                                                      
174 Id. at 294–96. 
175 See Simon Winchester, A Crack in the Edge of the World: America and the 
Great California Earthquake of 1906, at 330–31 (2005); Judy Yung & The Chinese 
Historical Soc’y of Am., San Francisco’s Chinatown 43 (2006). 
176 See discussion infra Part III.B–C. 
177 See discussion infra Part III.B–C. 
178 Bill Walsh, Official Blunt on Public Housing, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Apr. 25, 
2006, at 1. 
179 See Dyson, supra note 21, at 114–15. Author Michael Eric Dyson writes that Louisi-
ana Governor Kathleen Blanco, responding to media reports that blacks in many parts of 
New Orleans were looting and rioting out of control, authorized National Guard troops to 
shoot “hoodlums.” Id. at 114. 
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the hurricane.180 In the aftermath of Katrina, stories abounded of the 
criminal propensities and improvidence of these areas’ former resi-
dents.181 The media reported that government or private issue emer-
gency funds were misused to buy expensive toys, other luxury items, 
and in some cases drugs.182 Popular culture in the form of gangsta rap 
quickly picked up this strain. In the months following the hurricane, 
New Orleans rappers and deejays, exiled to locations all over the 
United States, released songs chronicling the events of Hurricane 
Katrina and its aftermath.183 In some cases it was not clear whether it 
was a case of art imitating life or art imagining life.184 
                                                                                                                      
180 In one instance, Councilman Chris Roberts of Jefferson Parish, a town near New 
Orleans that was slated to accept a number of families under the federally funded Housing 
Choice Voucher Program (formerly Section 8) wanted to legislate a requirement that land-
lords who accept federal housing subsidies must hire around-the-clock security. Meghan 
Gordon, Councilman Takes Back Security Plan, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), July 27, 
2006, at 1. Roberts, as a result of studying incident reports and riding along with local po-
lice, concluded that there was a “direct correlation between frequent crime and apart-
ments that the ‘government is giving away for free.’” Id. According to the councilman, 
“‘It’s no secret that if you go in New Orleans, the majority of the crime happens in public 
housing complexes’ . . . . ‘Unfortunately, in Jefferson Parish, they have turned private 
apartments into public housing complexes.’” Id. The proposed required security detail, in 
Roberts’s opinion, would have reduced crime in the parish. Id. Roberts later withdrew the 
proposal in the face of criticism that it was discriminatory. Id. 
181 E.g., Reckdahl, supra note 29. 
182 See id. 
183 See, e.g., Juvenile, Get Ya Hustle On, on Reality Check (Atlantic Records 2006); 
Tenth Ward Buck, What Is Your FEMA Number?, http://b.rox.com/media/fema-number. 
mp3 (transcript available at http://b.rox.com/archives/2006/03/29/what-is-your-fema-
number/). One artist sang a paean to the chaos after Katrina: 
The loamin hard sparkle like glass 
Main bitch right behind me lookin sharp in the Jag 
Security say you don’t know me so I talk to ‘em bad 
If a nigga want somethin I got somethin for his ass 
Choppers—I’m already knowin that it’s a G thang 
Ever since they tried to drown a nigga on the eastbank 
Everybody need a check from FEMA 
So he can go and sco’ him some co-ca-in-e 
Get money! And I ain’t gotta ball in the Beemer 
Man I’m tryin to live, I lost it all in Katrina (damn) 
And nobody cares what the police thank 
Everybody fuckin with ki’s cause it’s a street thang. 
Juvenile, supra. Yet another rap artist, in his salute to Hurricane Katrina, wrote and per-
formed a song titled What is Your FEMA Number? See Appendix B (providing lyrics as per-
formed by rap artist Tenth Ward Buck). 
 These artists perform a variant of hip hop music particular to New Orleans called 
bounce music. Bounce music is characterized by call and response party chants and dance 
call-outs and frequently has an undercurrent of techno-funk sound. It is akin to rap, but 
involves “festive beats” and “exuberant chants” yet basic lyrics. Kelefa Sanneh, Gangsta 
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 The conflation of poverty, blackness, and urban residency with law-
lessness is, writes one observer, one of the results of the so-called War 
on Poverty.185 The War on Poverty, rather than addressing the main-
stream institutional power arrangements that created and continue to 
sustain poverty, treats poverty and its ills as more attributable to internal 
factors such as the failings of black individuals and communities.186 In 
this view, poverty in black neighborhoods does not result from wide-
spread, external, and systemic social and political failings but instead is 
framed as an internal, localized, episodic, urban, self-generating, and 
overwhelmingly black problem which “naturally” engenders crime.187 
 This take on race, crime, and poverty is reproduced frequently by 
apparently well-meaning observers and even by some members of the 
black community.188 One commentator, in an effort to spur blacks to 
                                                                                                                      
Gumbo, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 2006, at § 2. The chants and sometimes claps are often 
interpersed with “shoutouts.” Sean Ross, Bounce Music Bounces Back, Airplay Monitor, 
Aug. 22, 2003. Though bounce music has not always enjoyed the wide appeal and fame of 
more standard rap or hip hop music, it is critically successful among hip hop enthusiasts in 
New Orleans and well beyond, and is increasingly becoming exemplary of New Orleans 
music in much the same way that Cajun music once defined the New Orleans sound. The 
vibrant eruption of bounce music that addressed Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath is a 
hopeful sign that a sound that is part of the unique flavor of black New Orleans which, 
now dispersed, may remain undiminished in the absence of New Orleans black residents. 
For a more in depth discussion of the above, see generally Nik Cohn, Triksta: Life and 
Death and New Orleans Rap (2005) and Cheryl L. Keyes, Rap Music and Street 
Consciousness (2004). 
184 See Keith Negus, Music Genres and Corporate Cultures 91 (1999); Imani 
Perry, Prophets of the Hood: Politics and Poetics in Hip Hop 90 (2004). One of the 
critiques of the gangsta rap genre is that it not only glorifies actual violence but also imag-
ined violence, and that it thus presents life in ghettos and poor neighborhoods as exces-
sively violent or profane and ultimately not true to reality. See Perry, supra, at 90. This is 
done in order to gain market share and “street cred,” or authority as one knowledgeable 
about life in poor minority neighborhoods. See id. Many of those involved in songwriting, 
production, and often the performance of gangta rap are themselves well-educated prod-
ucts of middle-class homes. See Negus, supra, at 91–92. For a discussion of the relationship 
between class, race, and rap, see generally Adam Krims, Rap Music and the Poetics of 
Identity (2000). 
185 Steven Gregory, Black Corona: Race and the Politics of Place in an Urban 
Community 105 (1999). 
186 See id. 
187 See id. 
188 See Juan Williams, Op-Ed., Getting Past Katrina, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 2006, at A17. 
Juan Williams writes that one of the biggest barriers to the return of poor blacks to New 
Orleans is not lack of government financing to rebuild housing but “poverty of spirit.” Id. 
Black comedian and recent social critic Bill Cosby, while acknowledging the hardships 
suffered by poor, black Katrina survivors, chided survivors for their failures to adequately 
parent and the consequent high crime rate in New Orleans before the hurricane. Cosby 
Charms, Chastises Crowd, Chattanooga Times Free Press, June 12, 2006, at B2. 
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take greater responsibility for the problem of black crime, decried the 
spread of a “cultural illness” in the black community.189 This illness 
produces sufferers who “don’t snitch on criminals, seldom marry, fre-
quently abandon their children, refer to themselves in the vilest terms 
(niggers, whores, etc.), spend extraordinary amounts of time kicking 
back in correctional institutions, and generally wallow in the deepest 
depths of degradation their irresponsible selves can find.”190 Such ac-
counts subvert and distort the meaning of culture, giving sustenance to 
notions such as the “culture of crime.” These rhetorical constructions 
posit crime as a socially transmitted, wholly voluntary set of traits that 
are characteristic of an entire group of people instead of the anoma-
lous perversion of social norms that it is. The ideological sibling of the 
culture of crime is the culture of victimhood, based on a “rhetoric of 
grievance” and “ressentiment” that become part of a group’s “constitu-
tive traits.”191 
 These claims about culture in poor, black communities, often 
made by persons who are socially and politically outside of those com-
munities, rely on assertions of the inherent neutrality of mainstream 
culture and ignore the social, political, and economic contexts of the 
people under discussion.192 They impose “culture from above” wherein 
external forces ascribe to members of a particular group a corrupt, 
arid, and perverse form of culture based on the ethnic or racial identity 
of the group to which they are presumed to belong.193 Such claims are 
                                                                                                                      
Scholar Michael Eric Dyson writes that some of the most prominent bashers of the 
black urban poor, or what he terms the “ghettocracy,” are members of the black middle 
and upper middle classes, which he calls the “Afristocracy.” Michael Eric Dyson, Is Bill 
Cosby Right?: Or Has the Black Middle Class Lost Its Mind?, at xiii–xiv (2005). 
189 Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., A Triumph of Felons and Failure, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 2006, at 
A27. 
190 Id. For a broader discussion of this point of view, see generally Juan Williams, 
Enough: The Phony Leaders, Dead-End Movements, and Culture of Failure That 
Are Undermining Black America—and What We Can Do About It (2006). 
191 Michael Dorland & Maurice Charland, Law, Rhetoric, and Irony in the 
Formation of Canadian Civil Culture 18 (2002) (citing Richard Jenkyns, Cards of Iden-
tity, N.Y. Rev. Books, Apr. 23, 1998, at 49, 50 (reviewing David Lowenthal, Possessed by 
the Past: The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (1996))). The use of “res-
sentiment” in this context comes from the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, who defined it 
generally as venting the effects of suffering by seeking a cause external to oneself as the 
source of that suffering. See Mary Sigler, By the Light of Virtue: Prison Rape and the Corruption 
of Character, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 561, 602–03 (2006). See generally Nietzsche, supra note 160. 
192 See Joseph H. Carens, Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual 
Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness 260–61 (2000). 
193 Abebe Zegeye et al., Resisting Ethnicity from Above: Social Identities and Democracy in 
South Africa, in Democracy and Governance Review: Mandela’s Legacy 1994-1999, at 
151, 152 (Yvonne G. Muthien et al. eds., 2000). I derive the expression “culture from 
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often the morally troubling signal of a fatigue with the problems of 
others and an effort to create social distance.194 In such accounts, inno-
cent, hardworking poor or working-class blacks become peripheral and 
are sidelined. When such innocent blacks suffer or fail, they are por-
trayed as marginal, barely existing victims of the prevailing “criminal” 
culture of the black community. When they succeed, which is rare be-
cause success is measured in giant steps rather than in small, measured 
steps, they are held up as bootstrapping role models to be plucked 
from the degradation of the ghetto and cultivated as hothouse flowers 
in mainstream white America. 
C. “Identity Cleavages” and “Vacuums of Authority” 
 One observer has suggested that the problems experienced by 
persons displaced in a disaster are often the result of or exacerbated by 
the “differentiated identities” of the victims.195 These identities may be 
based on a variety of factors such as race, ethnicity, or religion, any one 
of which may effectively serve as “identity cleavages.”196 Identity cleav-
ages sever members of the differentiated group from the dominant 
group in a society.197 When these persons also happen to be members 
of a marginalized or disfavored group already in conflict with the 
dominant group, the rights of citizenship are rarely fully available to 
them during a crisis of displacement.198 In such a case, displaced per-
sons are not “protected and assisted” as mainstream citizens during a 
crisis, but instead are “identified as part of the enemy, neglected and 
even persecuted.”199 For these displaced persons, many of the guaran-
tees of civic membership are absent, and citizenship becomes, if not 
contested, certainly contingent.200 Because they are disconnected from 
the enjoyment of the rights normally associated with the dignity of be-
ing a citizen, their marginalization “becomes tantamount to stateless-
                                                                                                                      
above” from the notion of “ethnicity from above” which has been used to describe the way 
in which an empowered minority of persons exercise hegemony via the imposition of poli-
ticized racial categories that serve to perpetuate inequality. Id. 
194 Veena Das & Arthur Kleinman, Introduction to Violence and Subjectivity, supra 
note 15, at 1, 4. 
195 Francis M. Deng, Divided Nations: The Paradox of National Protection, Annals Am. 
Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci., Jan. 2006, at 217, 219. Deng is the author of the Guiding Princi-
ples on Internal Displacement, discussed infra Parts IV.C, V. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 See Deng, supra note 195, at 219. 
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ness.”201 In these cases, there is frequently no governmental authority 
willing to assume responsibility for the displaced, and thus there is a 
“vacuum of responsibility” that may be filled by international law.202 
 The dual concepts of identity cleavage and the vacuum of respon-
sibility illuminate certain aspects of the situation facing poor, black 
Katrina evacuees.203 Almost immediately after the hurricane, there were 
statements disclaiming responsibility for victims by local, state, and fed-
eral authorities.204 This response, or rather lack of response, was one of 
the hallmarks of the crisis;  the government’s continual finger pointing 
and buck-passing conveyed the extent to which many of Hurricane 
Katrina’s victims were viewed with contempt.205 It was a poignant re-
minder of the way in which legal and political discourse concerning 
people of African ancestry involves an active and continual “othering” 
of blacks, which renders them outsiders.206 
 I have set forth some of the reasons for the displacement and dis-
possession of poor, black New Orleanians and shown how many of 
those barriers are housing related or based on the notion that poor 
blacks pose a security risk or are undesirable. I will now turn to possible 
remedies for dispossession and focus on how international law may be a 
source of a domestic right of return. 
IV. International Human Rights in the Context of  
Hurricane Katrina 
A. An Overview of the Development of International Law as a Source of Rights 
 The word “rights” carries great weight and raises expectations. 
Rights are entitlements, rights are freedoms, and ultimately, in all cases, 
rights are power. While the notion of rights has certainly been at the 
heart of most Western legal and social systems, rights have not necessar-
                                                                                                                      
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 See id. 
204 See Dyson, supra note 21, at 54–76. Author Michael Eric Dyson describes the extent 
to which the hurricane, though anticipated by officials and various levels of government, 
was all but ignored both before and immediately after it struck. See id.; see also Brinkley, 
supra note 5, at 56. 
205 See Dyson, supra note 21, at 54–76. 
206 See Nicholas B. Dirks, Introduction to Colonialism and Culture 1, 7–9 (Nicholas B. 
Dirks ed., 1992). 
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ily been expressed in positive terms.207 Historically, rather, the rights 
that guided and shaped the day-to-day lives of persons living in Western 
societies were often subtle, implicit, and not necessarily recorded. It has 
been argued, for example, that early peoples living in proto-
government societies lived by social contract.208 These contracts were 
implicit agreements whereby each person understood that in order to 
receive rights, they had to perform some duty in return.209 With the 
development of nation-states, the contractual aspect of rights became 
one wherein the exchange was between the individual and a sovereign 
leader.210 Social contract theory offered an account of social and politi-
cal relationships within the nation-state and ultimately of rights them-
selves.211 However, for the most part, social contract theory as it was ini-
tially conceived left the international arena, those spaces external to 
the individual nation-state, relatively undefined.212 In these interstitial 
spaces between nations, there was no fixed legal framework or interna-
tional sovereign, and nations existed in a “state of nature” wherein 
there was always the specter of war.213 
 Though modern nations have historically filled the void outside of 
the nation-state, some would argue that we are still in a state of nature 
regarding laws that govern international relations.214 Such laws, though 
perhaps more nuanced and refined than in past centuries, are still only 
provisionally valid.215 Nonetheless, there has long been a well-
understood system of laws and norms that govern international rela-
tionships, including both customary laws and basic forms of conven-
tional law.216 Since the period after World War I, however, there has 
                                                                                                                      
207 E.g., Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guaran-
tees?: Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 71 (1992) 
(“[M]any classical rights are often imagined in all but exclusively negative terms . . . .”). 
208 See Jill Stauffer, The Fiction of the State of Nature in Real Time: The Social Contract, Inter-
national Human Rights and the Refugee, in Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global 
Subject 3, 3–4 (Peter Fitzpatrick & Patricia Tuitt eds., 2004) (encapsulating the theories 
of Thomas Hobbes). 
209 Id. at 5. 
210 See id. at 5–6. 
211 See id. at 4. 
212 See id. at 3–4. For a broad discussion of the development of international law, see 
generally Wilhem G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (Michael Byers trans., 
rev. ed. 2000) (1984). 
213 See Stauffer, supra note 208, at 3–4. 
214 See id. 
215 See Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political The-
ory 168–69 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., Ciaran Cronin trans., 1998). 
216 See, e.g., Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: Interna-
tional Relations and Customary International Law 3–4 (1999) (describing custom-
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been an intensive focus on formalizing the process of developing in-
ternational law by coalitions of governments.217 The idea was to form a 
“government of governments,” and international law, rather than evolv-
ing only as the need arose, became the subject of continuous contem-
plation by international bodies created solely for this purpose.218 These 
bodies create rules which ideally have a legitimizing and constraining 
effect upon both the international and intra-national behavior of 
member nations.219 It is within this framework of international law that 
the notion of international human rights has developed. 
B. The International Bill of Human Rights 
 International human rights are a foundational aspect of more 
general international law norms.220 The language used in the Preamble 
of the Charter of the United Nations, the constitution of the United 
Nations whose provisions are paramount to all other treaties, supports 
this view.221 The Preamble states that “the Peoples of the United Na-
                                                                                                                      
ary international law as law governing the relationships between and among nations that 
have arisen from custom and usage, and recognized and accepted as binding even though 
not codified); H. Victor Condé, A Handbook of International Human Rights Ter-
minology 26 (2d ed. 2004) (1999) (describing conventional international law as referring 
to formal agreements between or among nations that are found in covenants, conventions, 
charter pacts, statutes, protocols, or other similar instruments). 
217 See Mark E. Villiger, Customary International Law And Treaties: A Manual 
on the Theory and Practice of the Interrelation of Sources 69–74 (2d ed. 1997) 
(1985). There have long been private attempts to codify of the law of nations. Id. at 65–67. 
These were undertaken by a diverse group of private individuals. Id. at 65–66. Among 
these private drafters were Jeremy Bentham and David Dudley Field, the drafter of the 
Field Code. Id. at 65. Some private organizations that undertook the codification of inter-
national law included entities such as the International Law Association and the Institut de 
Droit International. Id. at 66–67. 
218 See generally 3 Akira Iriye, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Rela-
tions: The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945, at 62–68, 205, 209–13 (1993). One of 
the earliest efforts was the League of Nations. Franz Cede, Historical and Legal Framework for 
Activities of the United Nations, in The United Nations: Law and Practice 3, 3 (Franz 
Cede & Lilly Sucharipa-Behrmann eds., 2001). The League of Nations was the first inter-
national intergovernmental organization. Id. at 3–4. It was formed after World War I to 
promote international cooperation among nations and to achieve peace. Id. at 3. It func-
tioned from 1920 until it was dissolved in 1946, after World War II. See id. at 5. Out of the 
League of Nations grew the United Nations, which was created in 1945 as another interna-
tional rule-making body. Id. at 6–7. The United Nations has 192 member states, which 
includes most internationally recognized independent nations. See United Nations, United 
Nations Member States, http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2007). 
219 Byers, supra note 216, at 6–7. 
220 Id. 
221 See U.N. Charter pmbl.; Theo van Boven, Human Rights and Rights of Peoples, 6 Eur. 
J. Int’l L. 461, 462 (1995), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol6/No3/art9.pdf. 
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tions [are] determined . . . to reaffirm [their] faith in fundamental 
human rights.”222 However, one query arising in a discussion of the 
concept of international human rights is whether they are “rights” at all 
under a general understanding of rights.223 Nonetheless, norms for in-
ternational human rights are clearly a well-entrenched part of interna-
tional law.224 
 Though international human rights have developed from a num-
ber of sources and over a long period of time, the International Bill of 
Rights presents a comprehensive normative framework.225 It encom-
passes several instruments, including: the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights; and the Second Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.226 Within some of these 
instruments, support for a domestic right of return may be found for 
displaced Katrina victims. 
C. International Human Rights, Hurricane Katrina and the Right of Return 
The right to return is hollow without a plan for transportation and a place 
to stay. 
—Rev. Jesse Jackson, speaking at a news conference at the site of 
the now famous levee breach on the Industrial Canal227 
 Invoking international human rights norms in the domestic con-
text is not a novel idea, and the use of international human rights law 
                                                                                                                      
222 U.N. Charter, supra note 221, pmbl.; van Boven, supra note 221, at 462. 
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224 See Henkin, supra note 223, at ix. 
225 See id. at 1–2 (describing the evolution of the contemporary notion of human 
rights); van Boven, supra note 221, at 463 (describing the International Bill of Human 
Rights). 
226 See Perry, supra note 184, at 12; van Boven, supra note 221, at 463; see also Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter 
ICESCR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Fact 
Sheet No.2. (Rev.1), The International Bill of Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/ 
2/fs2.htm. 
227 Bruce Nolan, Jackson: Housing Key to ‘Right of Return’, Times-Picayune (New Or-
leans), Jan. 31, 2006, at 8. 
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in United States domestic cases is increasing.228 With this heightened 
focus on the benefits of international law in domestic contexts, it is 
progressively clearer that there are few detailed international standards 
for disaster relief and prevention and that development of such stan-
dards must take into account the role of both international and domes-
tic actors.229 
 To the extent that there are existing international law norms to 
address disasters and the problems of those affected by them, few of 
these norms were followed after Hurricane Katrina. For example, a 
number of activists and NGOs have cited much of the chaos and depri-
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in disaster response. Id. The Declaration explained that “States have the primary responsi-
bility to protect the people and property on their territory from hazards, and . . . to give 
high priority to disaster risk reduction in national policy, consistent with their capacities 
and the resources available to them.” Id. 
Consider also the work of the International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Princi-
ples (IDRL) program, a project sponsored by the International Federation of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Int’l Fed’n of the Red Cross & Red Crescent 
Soc’ys., IDRL Appeal 2006–2007, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/pubs/ 
idrl/idrl-ga0607-revised.pdf. The IDRL program seeks to “raise awareness about . . . and to 
strengthen the international, regional and national frameworks of laws, rules and princi-
ples” so as to circumvent the operational challenges of disaster relief, and to “enable re-
quested international aid to be delivered as efficiently and effectively as possible.” Id. at 5–
6. The chief goal of the IDRL project is “to identify how the response to international dis-
asters could be improved through changes in both national and international law.” Todres 
& Marcogliese, supra, at 515. 
2007] A Domestic Right of Return in New Orleans in the Aftermath of Katrina 363 
vation occurring in the wake of Katrina, and the way in which those 
deprivations were disproportionately suffered by poor blacks, as an in-
dictment of the U.S. government’s clear violations of sections of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.230 Moreover, it has 
been observed that victims of Hurricane Katrina might be better served 
if the United States incorporated the socioeconomic rights of interna-
tional law into its domestic regime.231 
 One way of deploying international human rights norms in the 
context of Katrina would be to apply explicit international norms re-
garding what could effectively be called a “domestic right of return.”232 
Such norms are found in the Guiding Principles of Internal Displace-
ment.233 Protections for the internally displaced are also detailed in the 
London Declaration of International Law Principles on Internally Dis-
                                                                                                                      
230 See Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Ar-
ticle 40 of the Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding Observa-
tions of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/ 
CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006) (discussing race and poverty-related concerns associated with 
Katrina); The Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Pov-
erty, Report of the Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty on his 
Mission to the United States of America (24 October to 4 November 2005), ¶¶ 43–58, delivered to the 
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/43/Add.1 (Mar. 27, 2006); Oxfam 
Am., Recovering States? The Gulf Coast Six Months After the Storms (Oxfam 
Briefing Paper No. 4, 2006), available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublica- 
tions/publications/briefing_papers/recovering_states/oa_briefingpaper-04_FINAL.pdf; Press 
Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Evaluation of Human Rights in the Ameri-
cas During IACHR Regular Sessions, No. 07/06 (Mar. 17, 2006), available at http://www. 
cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2006/7.06eng.htm; Press Release, Nat’l Econ. & Soc. 
Rights Council, NESRI Statement: FEMA Hotel Evictions Violate Human Rights (Mar. 
2006), http://www.nesri.org/media_updates/fema_hotel_evictions.html; Letter from Ju-
dith Brown et al. to Santiago A. Canton, Executive Sec’y, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human 
Rights ( Jan. 17, 2006) (requesting hearing regarding human rights impact of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita), http://www.nilc.org/disaster_assistance/iachr_hearingrequestltr_2006-
1-17.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Human Rights Network, U.S. Human Rights Network Presents 
Report on Katrina Abuses to U.N. Committee ( July 11, 2006), available at http://www. 
ushrnetwork.org/pubs/USHRN%20release%20on%20ICCPR%20hearings.pdf; Statement 
of Jeanne M. Woods, Henry F. Bonura Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Univ. Sch. of 
Law, and Hope Lewis, Professor of Law and Faculty Director of Program on Human Rights 
and the Global Economy, Northeastern Univ. Sch. of Law, prepared for the Hearings of 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, Dr. Arjun Sengupta, on the 
Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.slaw.neu.edu/clinics/Woods 
Lewis.pdf. 
231 See generally Phillip A. Aka, Analyzing U.S. Commitment to Socioeconomic Human Rights, 
39 Akron L. Rev. 417 (2006). 
232 See Representative of the Sec’y-Gen., Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, § 5, 
submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 
1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
233 See id. 
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placed Persons (London Declaration).234 I will forgo discussion of the 
London Declaration in favor of a fuller discussion of the Guiding Prin-
ciples of Internal Displacement. First, I will discuss the right of return 
in international law as it applies to movements between nation states, 
and then I will discuss the norms for internal displacement. 
V. The Right of Return in International Law 
A. The Right of Return in General 
 The right of return is a concept in international law that allows for 
repatriation to a country of origin by former citizens or their descen-
dants.235 In some right of return regimes, the claimants may have no 
clearly articulated claim to descent from former citizens of a country; 
in such cases the right of return is offered based on generalized racial, 
religious, or ethnic background of the claimant.236 The right of return 
typically presumes that right holders will have access to all of the rights 
held by other citizens of a particular country.237 
B. The Relationship Between the Right of Return and the Right to Abode 
 As the phrase is commonly understood, the right to abode, some-
times stated as the right of abode, refers to the right of a person to re-
main indefinitely in a country without seeking explicit permission from 
the government. It is most often associated with citizenship or perma-
nent residency rights, though holders of the right of abode need not 
                                                                                                                      
234 Int’l Law Ass’n, Report of the 69th Conference 794–822 (2000). For a discus-
sion of the London Declaration, see Luke T. Lee, The London Declaration of International 
Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 454 (2001). 
235 See, e.g., Eric Rosand, The Right to Return Under International Law Following Mass Dislo-
cation: The Bosnia Precedent?, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1091, 1095 & n.17 (1998). 
236 See, e.g., Ayelet Sachar, Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Polity, in From Mi-
grants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World 386, 394–96 (T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2000). One example is Israel’s Right of Return for 
persons of Jewish ancestry. Id. The Israeli Right of Return, however, exists in stark contrast 
to the claims to a right of return made by former Palestinian residents of the same geo-
graphical territory. See Salman Abu Sitta, The Implementation of the Right of Return, in The 
New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid 299, 299 (Roane Carey ed., 2001). A more 
recent example is Ghana’s creation of a right of return (or right of abode as it is inter-
changeably called), which would allow U.S. citizens of African ancestry the right to live 
and work in Ghana as permanent residents, but would not necessarily confer any right to 
political participation. See Godfrey Mwakikagile, Relations Between Africans and 
African Americans: Misconceptions, Myths and Realities 353–56 (2d ed. 2006). 
237 See, e.g., Guiding Principles, supra note 232, § 1, Principle 1, ¶ 1; id. § 5, Principle 28, 
¶ 1. 
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have the full panoply of rights granted to citizens.238 Typically, individ-
ual nations make their own laws and norms regarding such issues as 
citizenship and permissions to enter or remain.239 A frequently cited 
example is the right of abode granted to some Hong Kong residents by 
Great Britain.240 
C. The Source of Normative Law Supporting the Right of Return 
 Countries that grant a right of return do so under the authority of 
their own national laws. However, there are also a number of interna-
tional human rights instruments that address the freedom of move-
ment as well as the right of return.241 For example, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that “[e]veryone has the 
right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of 
each State. . . . Everyone has the right to leave any country, including 
his own, and to return to his country.”242 While the UDHR does not 
have the force of law, it is a guiding document which “set up a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”243 The UDHR 
has been described as ranking with the Magna Carta, the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and the American 
Declaration of Independence.244 
 The provisions of the UDHR were rearticulated in two treaties 
drafted in 1966 and put into effect in 1976.245 The first is the Interna-
                                                                                                                      
238 See A.C. Evans, European Citizenship: A Novel Concept in EEC Law, 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 
679, 679–80 (1984). 
239 See id. 
240 British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act 1990, ch. 34, § 1, sched. 1 (Eng.). 
241 E.g., UDHR, supra note 226, art. 13; ICCPR, supra note 226, art. 12; African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 12, 21 I.L.M. 58, 61 (1982); American Convention on 
Human Rights, art. 22, Nov. 22, 1969, reprinted in Basic Documents on Human Rights 
504 (Ian Brownlie ed. 3d ed., 1992); Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, arts. 2–3, May 12, 1968, reprinted in Basic Documents on Human Rights, 
supra, at 347; Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 12, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982). For other examples and for further discussion of the right to movement, see Paul 
Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights 174–88 (1983). 
242 UDHR, supra note 226, art. 13. 
243 Eleanor Roosevelt, quoted in Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of In-
ternational Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in The Power of Human 
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change 1, 1 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 
1999). 
244 Thomas Buergenthal, Centerpiece of the Human Rights Revolution, in Reflections on 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Fiftieth Anniversary Anthology 
91, 91 (Barend Van der Heijden & Bahia Tahzib-Le eds., 1998). 
245 See ICCPR, supra note 226; ICESCR, supra note 226. 
366 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 27:325 
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).246 The other is 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).247 The two treaties effectively bifurcated the types of rights 
that were being articulated in the UDHR.248 
 Because the UDHR encompasses a wide range of rights that go well 
beyond political and civil rights and into the realm of social, economic, 
and cultural rights, it could not garner the international consensus 
necessary to become a binding treaty.249 In particular, a divide 
developed between some western industrialized nations with capitalist 
economic systems, such as the United States, and countries with socialist 
or mixed economies.250 Capitalist countries generally favored 
guaranteeing only civil and political rights, or what are known as first 
generation rights, while socialist nations favored guaranteeing only 
economic, social, and cultural rights, or second generation rights.251 
The dispute was solved by the development of the two separate treaties, 
the ICCPR and ICESCR, to which nations acceded according to their 
particular philosophies.252 
 The U.S. Senate ratified the ICCPR in 1992, with a number of 
reservations, understandings, and declarations.253 On June 4, 1992, 
President George H. W. Bush signed the instrument of ratification.254 
The Senate declared that “the provisions of Article 1 through 26 of the 
Covenant are not self-executing.”255 Therefore, the ICCPR did not 
create a private cause of action in U.S. courts and hence was of no 
authoritative value in domestic situations.256 However, even if there 
                                                                                                                      
246 ICCPR, supra note 226. 
247 ICESCR, supra note 226. 
248 See ICCPR, supra note 226; ICESCR, supra note 226; UDHR, supra note 226. 
249 See James Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 Fla. 
J. Int’l L. 261, 275–78 (2002) (discussing some of the criticisms of the ICESCR). 
250 See Diana G. Zoelle, Globalizing Concern for Women’s Human Rights: The 
Failure of the American Model 81 (2000). It has been suggested that the ICESCR is 
problematic from a capitalist perspective because it raises the specter of global redistribu-
tion and concerns itself with a global society rather than a global market. Id. at 79–80. 
251 Id. at 80–81. 
252 See id. at 80–82. 
253 See 138 Cong. Rec. S4781–84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). 
254 White House Statement on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 1 Pub. Papers 901 ( June 5, 1992). 
255 138 Cong. Rec. S4784. 
256 Id.; see S. Exec. Rep., No. 102–23, at 15 (1992). Where a treaty or covenant is not 
self-executing, and where Congress has not acted to implement the agreement with 
legislation, no private right of action is created by ratification. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 
617, 619–22 (Cal. 1952); see Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 370–76 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(discussing the relationship between ICCPR and the death penalty). 
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were such a cause of action, and particularly applying the provisions on 
internal freedom of movement and even analogizing the right to 
return, the problem still remains that these rights encapsulated in the 
ICCPR do not place explicit duty upon the government to ensure that 
conditions are such that evacuees have the tools they need to fully 
reestablish themselves, much less that conditions would permit their 
presence.257 Can the ICCPR, even if applicable, place a duty on the 
government? 
 The ICCPR includes a right of return, along with provisions on 
the right of free internal movement in Article 12: 
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within 
that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and free-
dom to choose his residence. 
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his 
own. 
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any re-
strictions except those which are provided by law, are neces-
sary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), 
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, 
and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the pre-
sent Covenant. 
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his 
own country.258 
Whether this provision supports a domestic right of return is not clear 
from its terms alone.259 To bridge this gap, the United Nations acted to 
create more explicit standards.260 
VI. A “Domestic Right of Return”? The Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement 
 Though the victims of Hurricane Katrina who fled their homes 
were frequently referred to as “refugees,” they are not, of course, refu-
gees in the common meaning of the word.261 Therefore, such persons 
may not rely on international provisions referring to refugees or other 
                                                                                                                      
257 See Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights 236–37 (2000). 
258 ICCPR, supra note 226, art. 12. 
259 See id. 
260 See discussion infra Part VI. 
261 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Hurricane Katrina and Internally Displaced Persons, Am. Soc’y 
Int’l L. Insights, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/09/insights050921. 
html; cf. Condé, supra note 216, at 125 (defining “refugee” as persons who have fled their 
country to avoid persecution). 
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externally displaced persons.262 Even though they are not “refugees,” 
for the period immediately after the hurricane and in some cases much 
longer, many of them found themselves in the same material conditions 
as refugees—bereft of home, family, and friends, while lacking basic 
necessities.263 Katrina evacuees are thus more similar to internally dis-
placed persons within the meaning of the 1998 Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement.264 
 No specific treaty protects the rights of persons displaced within 
their own national borders by natural disasters or other causes.265 To 
address this void, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
prepared a set of guidelines to be used in cases of internal displace-
ment.266 The resulting document, the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement (Guiding Principles), sets forth thirty principles detailing  
international laws that protect the human rights of internally displaced 
persons.267 The Guiding Principles outline the scope and purpose of 
the document and state general principles for ensuring humanitarian 
assistance.268 They also describe procedures for three phases of internal 
displacement: pre-displacement; displacement; and return, resettle-
ment, and reintegration.269 While the Guiding Principles have not been 
                                                                                                                      
262 See Kirgis, supra note 261. 
263 See id. For a discussion of the distinction between refugees and internally displaced 
persons, see Catherine Phuong, The International Protection of Internally Dis-
placed Persons 13–37 (2005). Phuong considers whether the exclusion of the internally 
displaced from the refugee category is justified, and concludes that the distinction should 
remain in place. Id. at 37. It has been argued by the United Nations High Commission on 
Refugees that “internally displaced persons are persons who would be refugees had they 
left their country,” and that hence the distinction between the two is so narrow as to not 
constitute a substantive difference. Id. at 29 (citing Representative of the Sec’y-Gen., Com-
prehensive Study Prepared by Mr. Francis M. Deng, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
the Human Rights Issues Related to Internally Displaced Persons Pursuant to Commission on Hu-
man Rights Resolution 1992/73, delivered to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1993/35 ( Jan. 21, 1993) and Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Div. 
of Int’l Protection, UNHCR’s Operational Experience with Internally Displaced Persons (Sept. 
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264 See Guiding Principles, supra note 232, at intro. ¶ 2. For a general discussion of inter-
nal displacement, see Chris Nwachukwu Okeke & James A. R. Nafziger, United States Migra-
tion Law: Essentials for Comparison, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 531 (Supp. 2006) and Maria Stavro-
poulou, The Right Not to Be Displaced, 9 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 689 (2004). 
265 Stavropoulou, supra note 264, at 735. 
266 Comm’n on Human Rights, Res. 1996/52, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1996/52 (Apr. 
19, 1996) (calling “upon the Representative of the Secretary-General to continue, on the 
basis of his compilation and analysis of legal norms, to develop an appropriate framework 
in this regard for the protection of internally displaced persons.”). 
267 See Guiding Principles, supra note 232. 
268 See id. §§ 1, 4. 
269 See id. §§ 2, 3, 5. 
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explicitly incorporated in any treaty, they have been accorded recogni-
tion by United Nations member states.270 
 The Guiding Principles describe individuals, such as the exiled 
Katrina survivors, as: 
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged 
to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, 
in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of 
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of 
human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who 
have not crossed an internationally recognized [international] 
State border.271 
Guiding Principle 28(1) effectively creates a domestic right of return 
for internally displaced persons by charging states with the “primary 
duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the 
means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, 
in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual resi-
dence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country.”272 Prin-
ciple 29(2) further details the duties of states to effectuate the return of 
displaced persons in such matters, stating: 
 Competent authorities have the duty and responsibility to 
assist returned and/or resettled internally displaced persons 
to recover, to the extent possible, their property and posses-
sions which they left behind or were dispossessed of upon 
their displacement. When recovery of such property and pos-
sessions is not possible, competent authorities shall provide or 
assist these persons in obtaining appropriate compensation or 
another form of just reparation.273 
                                                                                                                      
270 See G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 132, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005); G.A. Res. 58/ 
177, U.N. Doc. A/Res/58/177 (Dec. 22, 2003). On December 22, 2003 the U.N. General 
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internally displaced persons.” G.A. Res. 60/1, supra, ¶ 132 (footnote omitted). 
271 Guiding Principles, supra note 232, intro. ¶ 2. 
272 Id. § 5, Principle 28, ¶ 1. 
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 One significant caveat to the use of the Guiding Principles is that 
they do not have the force or effect of a treaty and therefore it can be 
argued that they are only advisory in nature.274 However, as one com-
mentator has observed, despite their non-binding status and relatively 
recent creation as an international norm, they have frequently been 
cited by countries addressing problems of internal displacement.275 In 
addition, several countries have added provisions modeled on the 
Guiding Principles to their domestic laws.276 Regional organizations 
have also made use of the principles.277 Perhaps surprisingly, even some 
“non-state actors,” as rebel army groups are sometimes called, have be-
gun to employ the Guiding Principles.278 Finally, even without having 
the force of law, the Guiding Principles may be significant tools in help-
ing governments develop their own legal standards because the Guid-
ing Principles offer “an authoritative statement of the rights of the in-
ternally displaced in one document.”279 
 It is clear that the Guiding Principles, if applied to the evacuees of 
New Orleans, would provide the numerous poor, black victims of Hur-
ricane Katrina the basic, yet currently non-existent, right to return to 
                                                                                                                      
274 See Roberta Cohen & Francis M. Deng, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis 
of Internal Displacement 73–76 (1998). 
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ger ed., 2001). Although traditionally only states were held responsible for human rights 
violations, there is a trend towards also making non-state actors accountable. Id. Non-state 
actors are generally divided into two principle types: private sector corporate actors such as 
multinational and transnational corporations, and non-governmental organizations. Rich-
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and Authority in the Global System 1, 1–2 (Richard A. Higgott et al. eds., 2000). 
279 Cohen & Deng, supra note 274, at 76. 
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their homes. Though no such binding authority currently exists provid-
ing this basic human right, it is certainly a goal that our country and its 
internal localities should adopt to prevent the permanent dislocation 
of peoples from their homes due to natural disaster, subsequent gov-
ernment coercion, or culturally tainted removal as in the current case 
of New Orleans. 
Conclusion 
 Using international human rights as the source of a domestic right 
of return for poor, black New Orleanians may result in the beginning 
of the kind of broad-based restorative justice that black people in the 
United States have lacked since their emancipation from slavery. A do-
mestic right of return in this circumstance, however, would impact well 
more than just the immediate victims. In the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, New Orleans is enmeshed in plans for a renaissance which in-
cludes a focus on economic revitalization and gentrification. This two-
pronged focus may cause the city to forget Katrina’s poor, black victims 
who are already disenfranchised by the unfolding drama. New Or-
leans’s vitality arises from the existence and affirmation of its black 
community and its unique culture and contributions; any attempt to 
recreate New Orleans without this vital group would result in a sterile 
imitation of the city that once was. 
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Appendix A 
I ain’t saying he’s a gold digger 
But he ain’t messing with no broke niggas[Repeat once] 
 
George Bush don’t like black people[Repeat four times] 
 
Hurricane came through, fucked us up ‘round here 
Government acting like it’s bad luck down here 
All I know is that you better bring some trucks ‘round here 
Wonder why I got my middle finger up ‘round here 
 
People lives on the line you declining to help 
Since you taking so much time we surviving ourself 
Just me and my pets, and my kids, and my spouse 
Trapped in my own house looking for a way out 
. . . . 
Five damn days, five long days 
And at the end of the fifth he walking in like “Hey!” 
Chilling on his vacation sitting patiently 
Them black folks gotta hope, gotta wait and see 
If FEMA really comes through in an emergency 
But nobody seem to have a sense of urgency 
Now the mayor’s been reduced to crying 
I guess Bush said, “Niggas been used to dying!”280 
                                                                                                                      
280 The Legendary K.O., supra note 21 (transcript available at http://www.nathanielturner. 
com/lyricstogeorgebushdoesntcare.htm). 
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Appendix B 
Wat is yo FEMA numba?(FEMA) (huh?) 
Yo FEMA numba (who?) 
Wat is yo FEMA numba? (FEMA) (huh?) 
Yo FEMA numba (who?) 
Wat is yo FEMA numba? (FEMA) (huh?) 
Yo FEMA numba (who?) 
I think it start wit 9 
I think it start wit 3 
Look I ain’t gettin’ off the phone till you give me me 
Man I walked through the flood wit these shoes on my feet 
And I need a fresh pair give me my 23 
So I can walk to the conda store 
Spend up the 23 so I can ask for more 
I smoke, I roll, I gamble, I save 
But I don’t know how I got broke in 2 days 
I’m lose and I’m low 
FEMA drop by and give me 50 more (oh) 
Red Cross came thru and gave me a couch 
Now I’m at the town getting golds in my mouth 
. . . . 
93105 wit the dash 
That’s my FEMA numba so gimme my cash 
I’m headed to the mall, shop at all the stores 
Don’t matter if I go broke you betta get yours 
You see I’m the CEO I just want you to know 
When I got my FEMA check baby I went bazerc 
I got golds and rims and all the tims 
I got a house wit my voucher from the disaster shelter 
Drop and give me 50 
23, 50 
Please FEMA give me 
Wat you got to give me 
I need some more 
So I can go 
To the shoppin center and buy some more clothes.281 
                                                                                                                      
281 Tenth Ward Buck, supra note 183. 
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